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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Deuelopment^ s:
(UNCTAD) Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences came into
force on the 6th October 1983 and to see to its implemen
tation, West African countries, like other nations, have
set up National Bodies and Legislations.

One aspect of

the implementation scheme has been the setting up of
Freight Booking Centres by most countries for the ”a
priori” control of their allocated A0% share of their
trade, a move which came under severe criticism by the
Lines from developed countries, who are members of the
Conferences operating to West Africa, notably the United
Kingdom - West Africa Joint Service (UKWAL) and the
Continent - West Africa Conference (COWAC),

West Africa Shipping Lines, like most lines in the third
World see this move as the only way to make sure that
their share is carried on their National fleet, and
despite the opposition' from the European Lines, their
Governments are going ahead to see to it that the
"a priori" control scheme becomes effective...

Before the advent of the Code,, in most of the Conferences
which Shipping Lines from West Africa participate, a
lion^s share of the cargo went to European' Lines,

For

example in the UKWAL which has a membership of eight
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Lines, (two from UK, five from West Africa, one cross
trade) the two Lines from UK had 50% of the Conference
Pool cargo (See Table 3,2),

about 80^ of the total cargo

carried by the Conference to West Africa were destined
for Nigeria, but her National Line,, the Nigeria National
Shipping Line (NNSL) a member of the Conference had only
31,5^ of the Pool Cargo.

It is therefore the objective of this paper to find out
whether the West Africa members of the Conferences ■«
operating to the sub-region can use the various schemes
which their Governments are setting up and backed by the
UNCTAD Code to change the operation of the Conferences toi
their advantage, and if they can, what the future of these
Conferences will be.

Chapter One of this paper will discuss the main features
of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conference while
Chapter Two takes on the general over—view of Liner
Shipping in West Africa.

In Chapter Three light will be

thrown on- the various measures being taken by West African
countries to implement the UNCTAD Code.

Special attention

will be paid to measures taken by Ghana and Ivory Coast.
In Chapter Four, light will be thrown on. Liner Shipping in
Ghana making special reference to how the code affects
liner shipping in Gharra as a whole, and her National Line,
Black Star Line in particular.

Chapter Five is devoted to

4
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a discussion on what is happening in UKUJAL and COUJAC
with the coming into force of the code, especially
regarding Membership and also member Lines'percentage
share of Pool cargo.
conclusion.

Chapter Six is for assessment and
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1

DEFINITIONS

The foilowing definitions are given in Part One,
Chapter 1 of the "United Nations Conference of Pleni
potentiaries on' a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences",
and the discussions in this paper will be restricted to
these definitions,
Mr

1.1.1

LINER CONFERENCE OR CONFERENCE

This is defined as a group of two or more vessel
operating carriers which provides international liner
services for the carriage of cargo on a particular
route or routes uithirr specified geographical limits
and which has an agreement or arrangement, whatever its
nature, within the framework of which they operate under
uniform or common- freight rates and any other agreed
conditions with respect to the provisions of liner
services,.

1.1.2

NATIONAL SHIPPING LINE

A national shipping line of any given country is a vessel
operating carrier which has its head office of management
and its effective control in that country and is recognised
as such by an appropriate authority of that country or
under the law of that country.

■y

«»
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Lines belonging to and operated by a joint venture
involving two or more countries and in', whose equity the
national interests, public and/or private, of those
countries have a substantial share and whose head office
of managsment and whose effective control is in one of
those countries can be recognised as a national line by
the appropriate authorities of these countries,

1.1.3

THIRD COUNTRY SHIPPING LINE (CROSS TRADER)
uc

A vessel—operating carrier in its operations between two
countries of which it is not a national shipping line.

1.1.4

SHIPPERS ORGANISATION

An association or equivalent body which promotes,
represents and protects the interest of shippers, and if
those authorities so desire, is recognised in that
capacity by the appropriate authority or authorities of
the country whose shippers it represents,

1.1.5

APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

Either government or a body designated by a government or
by national legislation to perform any of the functions
ascribed to such authority by the provisions of the code,.

»
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1,2

THE-MAIN SUBSTANTIUE PROUISIOMS OF THE CODE

Before discussing the main aspects of the code, a quick
glance at the main substantive provisions of the code
will- be useful.

-

These are abstracted belowr

Article 1 establishes, subject to stated criteria
right to membership of Conferences of national and
third flag shipping lines

-

Article 2 sets out, with the proviso

■*

’’Unless otherwise mutually agreed", the principle of
equal shares in any pooling or other similar arrangemeht
for Liners in importing and exporting countries, with
’’a significant share’’ indicatively given- as 20^ to third
flag lines where such exist.

Article 7 notes that loyalty arrangements with shippers
are authorised by that they should be based on the
contract system or any other system which is also
lawful
-

Article 9 provides that tariffs and related conditions
and/or regulations should be made available at reason
able cost to shippers and other parties concerned

-

Article ID provides for annual reporting by Conferences
of their activities

-

Article 11 establishes that consultations be held
%

between shippers and conferences

7
-

Article 12 sets out criteria for freight rates deter
mination,. with a prov/iso that other criteria be agreed

-

Article 14 provides for notice of freight rate increases
and reference to international mandatory conciliation,
for disputes which may not have been resolved through
consultation.

The code also provides (article 23-46) for the settlement
of disputes.

Basically it establishes a system of what

is called "International Mandatory Conciliation", a «
compromise reached between most developing countries
desiring a system of mandatory arbitration, and most
developed countries not wishing to have any mandatory
dispute settlement machinery at all.

(This mandatory

conciliation will be discussed later).

The principal aim of the code, therefore,is to facilitate
by sanction, not unilaterally by conference lines but by
consultative.processes under international law the
followingr

-

easier access of new fleets, particularly of developing
countries to conference services affecting their own
and third flag liner trades

-

reasonable constraint over the disposition of freight
charges

-

agreement on principles for trade participation among
exporting, importing and third states (the so' ca'lled

&
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40:40:20 principle)
-

establishment of dispute settlement machinery invokeable unilaterally by either party,

1«.3

SCOPE OF THE CODE

The very title of the convention specifies a code of
conduct for Liner Conferences.

Further Resolution No,2

on Non-Conference Lines, adopted concurrently with the
code on 6th April 1974, restates that the conventiorl* is
applicable to Liner Conferences and their external
relations,.

Thus the scope of the code would broadly appear to be as
follows:..

-

It would apply to what .are now called "self-regulated
conferences", that is. Conferences which do not serve
U.S type regulated liner trades,., since conferences
(

which are publicly regulated comprehensively, inwardly
and outwards inconsistently with the provisions of the
code would fall outside the scope of the code..

Some

one-third of all conferences serve U.S liner trade
which are regulated inwards and outwards by statute law
and regulation,.

The code would thus "prima facie",

only apply to the remaining two thirds of the worl.d^.s
conference .
-

It would not apply, on the basis of what had been said

g
above, to inter-governmental sponsored bi-lateral'
agreements that are unequivocally kept outside the
scope of the usual type of conference service.

Questions are often raised aS to whether the code applies
to conference services only, or to what is generally
described as the "total liner trade" of a particular
country.

By title, the code applies to liner conferences

and this can be supported by the fact that under Partici
pation in' Trade (Article 2), reference is made to m^bership of a Conference .........
conference.

in'trades covered by a

In determining shares of trade, reference

is made to participation in the trade carried by a
conference; to a conference carrying the foreign trade
between two countries; the traffic generated by the
foreign trade carried by a conference; to trade carried
by a conference; and to trade between, countries covered
by conference.

Reference is also made to shipping lines

fulfilling their conference obligations.

Also it is seen

that Resolution 2 refers to non-conference shipping lines,
and the code is considered applicable to liner conferences
and their external relations.

Non-conference lines

competing with conference lines are also distinguished,.
There is therefore no doubt about the fact that the code
applies to Liner Conferences .only.

It can therefore be deduced that the following fall out
side the scope of the Code,

ID
1,

Open Conferences, i.e., Conferences serving the
U.S trade

2,

Cargoes not carried by Conference

3,

Bilateral Agreements

4,

Military equipment for national defence purpose,
(Article 2, paragraph 17),

1.4

IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE CODE

Having considered the scope of the code, its principal
aim antJ its main provisions, attention u/ill now be
focussed on the important parts relevant to this paper.
These include Membership, Participation in. Trade,
Consultation Machinery, dispensation and machinery for
settlement of disputes..

1.4.1

MEMBERSHIP

Article 1 of Chapter 2, paragraphs 1-6 cater for the
criteria for membership of conferences.

It is provided

that any shipping line shall have the right to be a full
member of a conference which serves the foreign trade of
its country, provided

it conforms to the entry require

ments laid down by the conference as mentioned in
paragraph 2 of Article 1.

Also shipping lines which are

not national lines in any trade of a conference shall have
the right to become full members of that conference,
subject to the provisions regarding the share of trade as
set out in Article 2, dealing with third country shipping

&
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lines.

However as stated in paragraph 3, in considering an
application for membership by a third country shipping
line, irr addition to the provisions of Apticle 1, para
graph 2 mentioned above, the following criteria would
be taken into account:

-

The existing volume of trade on the route served
by the conference and the prospects of its growth

-

The adequacy of shipping space for the existing and
prospective volume of trade on the route served by
the conference

-

The probable effect of admission of the shipping
line to the conference' on the efficiency and quality
of the conference service

-

The current participation of the shipping line in
trade on the same route outside the framework of
another conference

-

The current participation of the shipping line on
. the same route within the framework of another
conference.

The present position in' most self regulated conference
is that membership is tightly controlled by the
conferences.

The usual reasons given for rejection

are over tonnaging of the trade or alledged incapacity
of the applicant line to adhere to conference schedules
and obligations.

Unrler the code, a conference refusing

a
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membership is required to give the grounds in writing and
to take into account the views of shippers, and of
appropriate authorities if they so request (Paragraphs
4-6 of Article 1),

1.4.2

PffRTICIPATION IIM TRADE

This is perhaps the most important aspect of the code
judging from the fact that cargo is the lifeblood of
shipping activities.

Invariably, almost all disputes*

in conferences since the coming into force of the code
has been on this topic.

Article 2 starts by saying that any shipping line admitted
to membership of a conference shall have sailing and
loading rights in the trade covered by the conference.
Paragraph 3 goes on to say that for the purpose of deter
mining the share of trade which member lines shall have
the right to acquire, the national lines of each coming
irrespective of the number of lines shall be regjprded as
a group of shipping lines for that country, . It is in.
Paragraph 4 where the cargo principle is laid out.

It

•i

states that when determining a share within a pool of
individual member lines and/or groups of national shipping
lines, the following principles regarding their rights to
participate in the trade carried by the conference shall
be observed, unless otherwise mutually agreed;

The group of national lines of each of two countries

&
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the foreign trade between which is carried by the'
conference shall have Equal Rights
in

to participate

the freight and volume of traffic generated by

their mutual foreign trade and carried by the
conference
-

Third country shipping lines, if any, shall have the
right to acquire a Significant Part, such as 20% in
freight and volume of traffic generated by the trade.

Provision is made for a situation where a country who€e
trade is carried by a conference and has no national
line.

In this situation, the country's cargo shall be
r

distributed among the individual member lines participat
ing in the trade in proportion to their respective share.

Paragraphs 6-17 deal with other aspects of, cargo sharing.
It is stated that the provisions of Article 2, paragraphs
1-16 inclusive concern all goods regardless of their
origin, their destination, or the use for which they are
intended, with the exception of military equipment for
national defence purposes.

It is worth noting here that, the so called 40:AO:20
principle is not a rigid quantitative formula which will
be forcibly thrust on nations.

The percentages reflected

in the code reflect purely indicatively, those trade
participation principles that are considered as "prima
facie” equitable between exporting, importing and third
flag states, in the context of permitting competition

14
from third flag states, unless agreed otherwise.

This is

seen in the provision for periodical re-adjustment of
shares,.

1.4.3

(Article 2 paragraph 9),

CONSULTATIOM WACHINERY

Article 11 dealirrg with consultation machinery stipulates
that there shall be consultations on matters of common
interest between a conference, shippers' organisations,
representatives of shippers, and where practicable shippers
which may be designated for that purpose by the appropriate
authority, if so desires..

It also provided that such

consultations shall take place whenever requested by any of
the parties mentioned above,.

The following items are given

as the matters which may be subject of consultation;

-

changes in general tariff conditions and related
regulations

-

changes in’ the general level of tariff rates and rates
of major commodities

-

promotional and/or special freight rates

-

imposition of, and related changes in, surcharges

-

loyalty arrangements, their establishment or changes
in their form and general condition

-

changes in the tariff classification.of ports

-

procedure for the supply of necessary information by
shippers concerning the expected volume and nature of
their cargoes, and

o

-
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presentation of cargo for shipment and the require
ments regarding notice of cargo availability

As a principle, consultations are to begin not later
than 30 days after receipt of the proposal for consul
tations unless different periods of time are provided in
the code,.

It is interesting to note that there is increasing wide
spread interest in. the establishment of effective
consultation machinery for shipowners and shippers to
discuss common needs and interests,.

Unilateral action,

by conferences lead to misunderstanding,, while the taking
of decisions at a headquarters remote from the countries
of export and import gives the impression that the
interest of shippers imports and national interests are
ignored.

In shipping, where both the trader and the

shipowner depend on each other so closely, consultation,
at all stages of decision making and on all matters is
essentials

Since Shippers^ Councils represent most countries at
negotiations with conferences, it will be necessary to
make a note on them at this point.

The main purpose of a Shippers' Council is to unite
shippers and to give them the necessary bargaining
strength to obtain adequate and efficient services at
the minimum cost.

There is another purpose in setting up

&
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a Shippers^ Council which is also important, that of
providing shipowners, government agencies and Port
Authorities with a means of communicating with Shippers
and of obtaining an authoritative shipper viewpoint.
The immediate function of a newly formed council will
usually be to exert maximum pressure to reduce con
ference demands for freight increases..

It must not,

however, confine itself solely to the defensive role
of reacting to conference demands but must be ready to
take the initiative in collaboration with the shipping
investigation unit (if it exists in. a country) and other
arms of government shipping policy in assessing the
suitability of existing services, and in- investigating
the possibilities of more economical alternatives,.

l.A.A

DISPENSATION

Paragraph 2 of Article 8 says,, in Ports where conference
services are arranged subject to the availability of a
specified minimum of cargo, but either the shipping line
does not call, despite due notice by shippers, or the
shipping line does not reply with an agreed time to the
notice given by shippers, shippers shall automatically
have the right, without prejudicing their loyalty status
to use any available vessel for the carriage of their
cargo,.

This portion of the code, in my opinion,, serves two
useful purposes, apart from its original message.

In the
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first place, it buttresses the fact that the code is. for
liner conferences, and secondly it answers the fears of
most European lines who are worried about the setting up
of freight Booking Bureau by countries in the third world.
This second point will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3,

1,4„5

flACHINERY FOR SETTLEfflENT OF DISPUTES

A fundamental need of developing countries was to have
provisions in the code for a viable dispute machinery to
which either party could resort covering the whole range
of disputes which can arise in conference operations,
Most existing conferences have no such provisions, at
least, in regards to such matters as membership,, loyalty
agreement, trade participation or freight.

Initially, the majority of developing countries wanted
a system of mandatory arbitration and eventually the present
system of mandatory conciliation put forward by the deve
loped countries as a compromise solution was accepted, as
the alternative would have been no provisions at all,
which only the developed countries wanted.

Perhaps the single item in the code to which much atten
tion is paid, is the provisions and machinery for settle
ment of disputes.

Articles 23-46 divided into three

parts, general provisions, international mandatory^
conciliation, and institutional machinery discuss into
detail this issue.

o
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Under International Mandatory conciliation, the
appropriate authorities of a contracting party shall if
they so request, participate in the conciliation^, pro
ceedings in support of a party being a- national of that
contracting party, or in support of a party having a
dispute arising in the context of the foreign trade of
that contracting party.

The appropriate authority may

alternatively act as an observer in such conciliation
proceedings.

The proceedings are to take place in a

place unanimously agreed to by the parties or failing
such agreement, in the place decided upon by the
conciliators.

Paragraph 2 of Article 29 demands that

in determining the place of conciliation proceedings,
the parties and the conciliators shall take into account,
inter alia, countries which are closely connected with
the dispute, bearing in mind the country of the shipping
line concerned and, especially when the dispute is related
to cargo, the country where the cargo originates,.

1.5

THE VIEliJS OF NATIOMS ON THE CODE

The code is a manifestation, of the world wide endeavour
of developing countries to obtain a better share of the
world's wealth,.

Focusing on international liner shipping

the code reflects a power struggle between a large numbsr
of developing countries and a relatively smaller number
of traditional maritime countries.

It also reflects the

continuing debate between those who advocate commercial
control of international trade and those who prefer

o
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government management and regulation.

The final language

of the code represents a political compromise among the
diverse views of many nations,.

1.5..1

THE GROUP OF 77 VIEliJ

The Group of 77, the developing countries that were the
initiators and are among the chief proponents of the code,
see the code as a means of eliminating discrimination in
the ocean conference system.

For them the code gra^its

national carriers virtually automatic entry into
conferences and effective control over the way conferences
operate in their trades.

In effect, the code is a means

to redistribute liner trade control to the numerically
(but not commercially) superior developing countries,.
These countries general favour rigid application of the
code s conference organisation mandatory cargo sharing and
consultation procedures,.

1.5,2

THE EUROPEAN VIEW

The ten-member European' community has officially adopted
a regulation that establishes specific conditions under
which community member states are to accede to the code.
In essence, the regulation accepts the provisions of the
code for trade between the community and developing
countries but opts for continuation of the "Status quo"
for trade between the community and developed countries
which accept the code, with reciprocity agreements among

o
2 0

developing countries to allow cross trading in each
others developing country trades,-

The Scandinavian countries along with the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Greece have expressed concern that
the code may serve as a vehicle to eliminate independent
(non-conference) cross traders.

Such elimination is a

possibility under a rigid application of the code to ajust
tha conference portion .of the trade rather than to all
liner trade.

Their implementing legislation is ex;oected

to seek to prevent elimination of non—conference crosstraders in code trades,

1,5..3

OTHER COUNTRY VIEUPOINTS

Many of the communi-st nations of Eastern Europe, China
and Cuba have acceded to the code with reservations that
exempt the bilateral trade agreements under which most
of their liner shipper is conducted.

Several South

American nations have done likewise.

There is opposition to the code among some developing
countries,; particularly those with a strong free
market orientation and those with well developed merchant
marines heavily engaged in cross trading (such as Israel,
Hong Kong and Singapore),

1.5.A

UNITED STATES VIEliJ

Based on its traditional free-market principles, and on

0
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the numerous conflicts betuieen existing U. S laws and ,the
code^ the U.S government position has been to oppose the
code.

Wost U.S carriers agree that bilateral liner

agreements tailored to the requirements of each trade are
a preferable course of government action to ratification
of the code..

It is observed that the United States

oppose the code on several grounds, more particular
because;

(a)

Its membership provisions encourage the continuation of the closed conference system

(b)

The provisions for pooling the conference cargo,
also those providing for the allocation of a
percentage "such as 20 percent" for the third flag
carriers in combination with the establishment of
equal rights for the directly trading countries,,
i.e the supposed A0:40;20 formular would in the
long run tend to increase costs and reduce the
quality of service in' a trade

(c)

The provisions which stipulates for 15 month rate
stability is damaging in view of that the period
is unreasonab-ly long

(d)

To the view of the U.S Administration,, national
lines are given, by the code, undue power since
article 3 provides for a veto power in their favour,
by stipulating that "a decisiorr, cannot be taken in
respect of matters defined in a conference agree
ment relating to the trade between two countries
without the consent of the national shipping lines
of those two countries"*

0
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Regarding this latter point, it could usefully be
recalled that the U.S has a history of legislative rules^
which to the opinion of the U.S government were necessary
for an adequate protection of U.S interests, against
decision's taken by foreign based conferences.

It might

be that, the American opposition to the code derives
less from any detailed points of different approach to
particular problems like those referred to above and more
from general government policy philosophy.

The government

of the United States of America has adopted and follfowed
a de-regulating philosophy in the economy, insisting in
that the free-enterprise system should be allowed to
work without any distortions which the government inter
ventions might creat.

Such had been the ptiilosophy

behind the Shipping Act of 1984 which curtailed signifi
cantly the regulatory powers of the Federal Maritime
Commission. (FMC),.

1.5.5

RESERWATIONS TO THE CODE

The Uienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1905) which
is in force, describes a reservation as a "Unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the"legal
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica
tion to the State",

It further provides.that a State may

formulate a reservation unless it is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.

An objection by another

0
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Contracting Party to a reservation does not preclude the
entry into force of the treaty as between, objecting and
reserving state unless a contrary intention' is definately
expressed by the objecting state; tacit consent'being
presumed from failure to object to a reservation.

As seen in 1.5.4, some countries have made reservations
to the code.

Several of them wish to continue to adhere

to bilateral agreements whilst one country has stated that
it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 4 of*
Article 2.

The question which remains is who would decide

on the validity of Reservations.

This is a question which

contracting parties would have to decide, as the Code is
silent on Reservations,

Let us look closely at those

very Articles to which Reservations have been addressed,
on I'lembership and on articles 2, 3 and 14 (5) and (9),

I

append below some of the elasticities which I believe are
built into the texts of the various articles;

Article 2 (Trade Participation)
Paragraph

4:

"Unless otherwise mutually agreed"

Paragraph

9;

"Trade sharing agreements shall be
reviewed periodically ,,,,"

Paragraph 19;

"The application of the Article ,,,,
shall be completed within a transition
period ....

Taking into account the *

specific situation in each of the trades
concerned

a
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Article

3;

(Decision-making Procedures)

These shall be based on equality of all full member
Conference Lines; ensuring that voting rules do not
hinder the proper work of the Conference and service of
the trade and shall define matters on which decisions
will be made by unanimity.

Decisions cannot, however,

be taken regarding matters defined in Conference agree
ments relating to trade between two countries without the
consent of national shipping lines of those two countries.

Article

14:

Paragraph B;

(General Freight Rate Increases)
A general freight rate increase may be
implemented by a conference

Paragraph 9:

(a) "Conferences should institute any
general freight increase
(b) "Unless otherwise agreed during
consultations, minimum period of time
between dates when one general freight
increase becomes effective and date of
notice for next increase •••••

Shall

. not be less than 10 months".

In the view of some observers, the language of these texts
contains inbuilt elasticities, or to be precise,, "reserva
tions" - which would permit parties:

(a)

to agree measures other than those primarily

o
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addressed in the provisions; or
(b)

to review the agreed provisions periodically; or

(c)

to act subject to specific situation prevailing
irr individual conference trades; or

(d)

not to act so as to hinder the work of conferences
and services; or

(e)

act with discretion if they decide to act at all.

Against such background we will discuss briefly the EEC
Reservations..

.

«

EEC RESERUATIONS

The structure of the EEC Regulation'on- the Code is drawn
such that the text of the Reservations is annexed to it.
The various individual Reservations purport to extend
the term "national shipping line", as defined in the code
to include, in the case of EEC member states^ any line
established in an EEC member state; disapply article 2 on
Trade Participation, Article 3 on Decision Waking Procedures,
and article 14 (a) on General Freight Rate Increases, in.
intra-EEC Conference trades and reciprocally.to intraEEC-OECD trades where OCED countries may also be
Contracting Parties to the Code, allowing however shipping
lines of developing countries to apply for participation'
as third country carriers in those trades,.

At UNCTAD

\J

at Wanila (June 1979) some countries inquired

4
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ujhether the interests of developing countries in int'raOECD-EEC liner trades under the EEC Regulations mould be
governed by the Regulation or the 1974 Code,

If the

an'suier was yes, they felt the Regulation mould then' give
lesser protection, in intra-EEC-OECD trades to developing
country lines and/or shippers than they mould othermise
enjoy under the 1974 code.

Socialist countries also ask

mhether their fleet mould be excluded from intra-EEC-OECD
trades under the Regulation,

The EEC representative

stated that developing countries' rights mould be governed
in intra-EEC-OECD trades by the Code "Subject to the
Regulation", and they need fear no discrimination.

The

Socialist countries mere told that they could compete in
the same may as the other developed countries for partici
pation in intra-EEC-OECD trades.

The question of the Reservations surfaced again at the
Ninth Session of the UNCTAD Committee on Shipping in
September 1980 mhen the Socialist countries of Eastern
Europe questioned the validity of the EEC Regulation in
terms of "universality" mhich the General Assembly in its
Resolution 3035 (XXUII) had desired for the Code,

The

EEC spokesman replied that the Regulation mas "realistic"
in that mhile the community mished to acknomledge
"positively and practiJ^lly" the aspirations of develop-*
ing countries in liner conference shippingy it had at the
same time to maintain a commercial approach in intraEEC-OECD liner trades.

<»
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Be all this as it may,, the question of reservation
presses,-

There is a sense of tremendous relief in many

circles that the EEC,, having frozen" possible implementa
tion of the code for some years while they debated what
its members should do, has finally come up with what it
itself considers to be a positive move forward,.

Mr

&
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CHAPTER TWO

2.1

LEGISLATIONS AND inPLEPIENTATION PRACTICES

ADOPTED BY SO|V]E COUNTRIES IIM THE THIRD WORLD

Both codist and non-codist countries in the third world
have been working on appropriate legislations and imple
mentation schemes to help their national fleet carry a
substantial portion of their trade.

While some countries

have managed to pass legislations to back their schemes
some are still discussing the issues involved*.

Before we take a look at the scheme implemented in
Ivory Coast and Ghan^a (yet to be approved by Government)
we will see what is being done in some countries in the
third world,

2.1.1

BANGLADESH

The Government has instituted a legislation which reserves
AO^ of both imports and exports to national flag vessels.
This is not yet implemented but every effort is being
made to get it going.

EGYPT

In Egypt, all Government cargoes plus

Z0%

of all imports

and exports are reserved for Egyptian flag ships.

To

support this, state cargo allocation agency gives priority
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to the state line and second preference is given to major
Egyptian private lines.

INDIA

All Government cargoes are reserved to the national flag
vessels.

There is further legislation reserving 40% of

all export cargoes to the national fleet,

INDONESIA

A decree of April 1982 reserves a wide interpretation of
cargoes to Indonesian', vessels.

However, despite this

protectionist measure, Indonesia claims to carry only 10%
of her International Seaborne trade,

PHILIPPINES

There was an original decree which reserved all government
cargoes to national flag vessels but subsequent decree
(January 1982) reserves 40% of all liner trade to
Philippine vessels and further 40% to the trade partner.
Legislation on government cargo (which accounts for
majority share of trade) is already in force.

SRI LANKA'

There has been a recent decision that all government
cargoes must be carried by the state shipping line.

All
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export Ccjrgo is allocated by the Ceylon Freight Bureau
since 1971,

Preference is given to the State line, and

then Freight Line (LGM),

CAWERDON

In Cameroon, all cargoes are reserved to CAFISHIP, the
state shipping line, unless trading partner has 4D;40:20
agreement dividing the whole trade.

In practice, CAMSHIP

takes all best cargoes and probably a BD^ share.

Non*€

Conference lines are completely excluded in the absence
of bilateral agreements.

TANZANIA

Here, legislation has been passed to set up the Tanzanian
Freight Bureau with powers to control all imports and
exports*

2.1.2

THE IVORY COAST SYSTEM

Ivory Coast has been one of the pioneers of the full
implementation of UNCTAD's 40:40:20 cargo sharing
formula, and has thereby succeeded in carrying almost
40^ of its trade with Europe since 1979,.

Backed up by

two official supervisory and administrative bodies in
Abidjan, the Ivorian national line, SITRAM, has led
West Africa in its development of a fleet specifically
geared to carry its own national trade share.

With

K

0

a 32

^

equal relevance for breakbulk as u/ell as container
traffic, the unique Ivorian Implementation of the code
provides a taste of trends to come in liner shipping.

The Ivorian approach to implementing 40;AO;20 has not
only been extremely rigid and well defined in terms of
its aims but also very comprehensive in the control and
monitoring of all cargo coming to and going from that
country..

Not a single ship, container or breakbulk

arriving in or departing from the Ivory Coast^s poiits
can avoid the scrutiny of the Ivorian bodies created to
control the carriage of the country's trade.

Indeed, th

implementation of the code goes beyond controlling the
Ivory Coast's AO^ of the trade, and even comprises the
allocation of these percentages pertaining to the fleets
of all foreign trade partners.

’ OIC AND SISA

On December 25, 1975 the Ivory Coast Shippers'Council
or the Office Ivorien de Chargeurs (DIC) was set up to
oversee the full implementation of the code.

The DIC

has since become an invaluable element in the implemen
tation of the A0;AD;20,. as well as the general maritime
policy adopted by the Ivory Coast.

Another aspect of

Ivory Coast's bid to put the A0;A0;20 concept into
reality on its main trade route, i.e that to Europe, is
SISA (SITRAN International Shipping Agencies), which was
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formed in 1977,

Although SISA was created primarily as

a Liner Agency concern, its role has been enlarged by
the Ivorian government to encompass the control and
allocation of cargo sharing among all national lines
participating in the trade between. Ivory Coast and
Europe in order words to control under the supervision
of the QIC, all loading and cargo booking to and from
the country.

Between them, SITRAfO, SISA and QIC had by the end of «*
1979,. all but achieved the successful implementation of
40:40:20 on the Ivory Coast main tr.ade route (See
Table 2,1),

An important wing of the OIC has been the Freight
Committee,

The OIC describes this division as having

a threefold mandate upon the following lines:

-

to evolve the measure and mechanism destined to
the regulation of the maritime trade of the Ivory
Coast

-

to secure full and profitable employment for the
national merchant fleet

-

to assist the rationalisation of traffic between
Ivory Coast and trading partners

Basically the above mandate involves the implementation
and full adoption of the 40:40:20 cargo sharing principle
J

embodied in the Liner Conferences' code of conduct.

3A
TABLE 2..1

TEU HAMDLING FIGURES BY THE IVIAIN OPERATORS
CALLING AT THE PORT OF ABIDJAN FDR 1979>
STATISTICS SUPPLIED BY PORT OF ABIDJAN

TEU
LINE

IMPORT

EXPORT

TONNES
TOTAL

IMPORT

EXPORT

TOTAL

SNCDV

8,183

10,318 18,.5011

82,722 119,812 202,534

SITRAm°

6,157

6,711 12,868

70,498 100,011 170,509

WOERFIAN'

1,221

2,110

3,321

17,627

27,192

39 ,*^58

EAC

1,024

1,231

2,255

11,649

17,609

39,258

SIV0IV1AR°

1,031

823

1,854

10,952

8,978

19,930

LLOYD
TRIESTNO

2,481

3,622

6,008

26,338

33,268

59,606

SITRAM AND SIl/OMAR, THE TWO NATIONAL LINES OF
IVORY COAST CARRIED 35.5^-

SOURCE:

CONTAINERISATION INTERNATIONAL:

FIAY 1980

In allocation of cargo on. a given- route SISA follows a
basic outline of priority for cargo carriage for each line
involved.

For example on the trade between Ivory Coast

and France, cargo priority appears in the following order:

1,

Ivorian flag

2,

French flag/Conference Line

3,

French flag/Non-Conference line

A
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4.

Cross trader/Conference Line

5.

Cross trader/Non-Conference Line

Referring to this priority listing for cargo allocation
SISA openly admits that outsiders and cross traders have
the last priority of all (unless like EAL, the outside
line can come to agreement for sharing its national
cargo under governmental auspices).

All in all, the general view gained from the look at^the
Ivory Coast's implementation of the UNCTAD code is that
it is awe-inspiring in its comprehensive and absolute
control of the maritime trade of the country,

I'^any would

say it is far too tightly controlled, and that if such an
organisation were to become common to all developing
countries, then pure commercially-based shipping

competi

tion cannot be pursued with much success in the future.-

On the other hand, many would argue that the Ivory Coast
has effectively rationalised *the whole trade to ensure
regular service to shippers and full ships to shipowners,
while at the same time giving the Ivory Coast its share
of the trade,

Whatever the final judgement upon the situation with
regard to the Ivory Coast's

shipping policy, it can be

said that the UNCTAD code has certainly benefited
Ivorian shipping, and the application thereof (though

St
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both unique and controversial) is workable and proved
that in the right circumstances, it can be enforced,

1.3

GHANA

In. October 1983, an- UNCTAD Code Implementation- Committee
was set up in the country to draw up a scheme for the
successful implementation of the code.

The Committee

composed of officials from Ghana Shippers' Council,
Black Star Line (The National Shipping Line),,

flinis-try

of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Trade,
representative of Private National Lines, Ghana National
Procurement Agency, Bank of Ghana and State Insurance
Corporation.

The main features of the Legislation drawn up by the
Committee (legislation yet to be approved by Government)
are:

(a)

The setting up of a Freight Booking Centre, to see
to the strict allocation of cargo on 40:40:20 basis

(b)

Cocoa, which is the number one export of the country
because of its sensitive nature is not to be in the
pool but to be reserved solely for the National
fleet (provided they call on the ports where the
cocoa shipments are destined).

However an official

of the Freight Booking Centre is to be on the Cocoa
-Allocation Committee of the Cocoa Marketing Company
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(c)

All imports financed through the Central Bank ate to
be on FOB basis.

This is to ensure the strict

allocation of government sponsored cargo to
national flag vessels.

All exports to be on C & F

basis
(d)

A' waiver system is to be practised to enable cargo
shipped on other vessels when national flag vessels
are not available

(e)

The Shippers^ Council (Cargo Allocation Committee)
is to open cargo booking offices in London^ New ^^o^k
and Hamburg to see to the strict allocation of all
cargo going to Ghana on the 40:.40;20 formula

(f)

Every shipper must be registered with the Ghana
Shippers' Council through an authorised representa
tive who will deal on his behalf, with all the
problems relating to loading and discharging of
maritime cargo belonging to him.

The names and

addresses of the said representativ-e must be for
warded in writing to the Ghana Shippers' Council in
Accra
(g)

In the case of exportation, no goods will be embarked
or loaded on a foreign ship in any port in Ghana unless
the customs declaration in respect of the said goods is
supported with a visa from the Ghana Shippers

(h)

Council

In the case of importation, shippers must rigidly
respect the AO; 40:20 formula (40^ to national ships,
40% to their commercial partners and 20% to the other
third party lines) and specify in the contract for

0
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transportation that carriage by sea shall be made in
the first place in ships owned by Ghanaian shipowners^
In that case a visa must be obtained from the Ghana
Shippers' Council prior to the loading of the cargo
on, board foreign ships
(i)

All shipping lines must forward the import/export
manifests to the Ghana Shippers' Council not later
than 3 days after the departure from or arrival of
a ship in. a Ghanaian port

(j)

Loading dispensation will be granted to any shipper
whose goods cannot be carried by the National Shipping
lines on account of insufficient space or unfavourable
technical conditions

(k)

Exports and importers may, after having obtained the
visa from the Ghana Shippers' Council, load the
remainder of the whole Ghanaian cargo on board liner
Conference member ships, and outsider ships operating
the approved freight rates

(l)

In the case of goods leaving or entering ports not
served by the National lines,, dispensation will be
granted on loading,

A dispensation which shall be

, valid for 3 months will be issued in the following
cases:
-

goods which are still not transferable by national
ships

-

goods leaving or entering ports not still covered
or served by national ships
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It is expected that,, when implemented, this scheme will
be strict and effective like the Ivorian system so as to
make the sharing formula a reality..

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the implementa
tion of the code in- West Africa has been the lack of
enthusiasm on the part of Nigeria to implement the code,
Nigeria is considered the backbone, of Shipping in Wes,t
Africa, her cargoes carried by Conferences to the subregion,

(See Table 2,2)..

Experts feel the code will

benefit Nigeria more than any other country in the subregion, and therefore find it difficult to understand why
serious efforts have not been made to implement the code.
Attempts were made by the civilian government in 1981 but
soon after the military intervention in 1983 the exercise
was abandoned.

The main objective of the "abandoned" legislation among
others, was "to correct the existing imbalance in the
shipping trade and implement the entire provision of the
UNCTAD code on the 40:40;20 sharing formular."

It was

mentioned in the document that:

(a)

The Nigerian national carriers shall hav-e the
carrying rights of at least 40^ of the freight in
revenue and volume of the total trade to and from
Nigeria

^

a
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(b)

The shipping line or group of shipping lines being
recognised national lines of the cargo originating
and countries which trade with Nigeria shall have
the carrying rights of 40/? of the freight in
revenue and volume

(c)

ffll recognised third flag carriers or cross traders
shall be entitled to the remaining

2Q%

of the

freight in volume and valve
(d)

All importers an"d exporters whose businesses are
registered in Nigeria shall reserve the carriage
of their sea freight to Nigerian national carriers
and recognised conferences for the purpose of
allocation

(e)

Nigeria's share of 40^ on each trade route will be
allocated to recognised Nigerian national carriers
according to a sharing scheme to be worked out by
the Implementation Committee on the National
Policy on Shipping

(f)

In addition to the UNCTAD provision, the Nigerian
shipping policy provides that the carriage of 40^
in volume and valve of the bulk cargo generated by
Nigeria's seaborne trade shall be carried by
recognised Nigerian carriers

(g)

Another addition to the UNCTAD Code provides that
Nigeria will enter into bilateral shipping agree
ments with other countries for carriage of goods
on basis that they may be at variance with that
of UNCTAD

«»
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TffBLE 2.2

U.K - liiEST AFRICA JOINT SERVICE (UKlt/AL)
CARRYINGS IN FREIGHT TONNES (OOO^S)

Nigeria Cargo
Non Nigeria Cargo
Overall
Nigeria
SOURCE:

%

of Overall

1981

1982

1252.5

'892*3

247.4

215.9

156.2

59.0

1468.4

1048.5

306.4

85%

85%

1983

81%

UKWAL STATISTICS 1983

In order to ensure the effective implementation of this
policy, an Implementation Committee was to be set up by
the Federal Government to advise the Minister of
Transport in the following areas of shipping activities:

(a)

The implementation of the provisions of the UNCTAD
Code within the framework of International Shipping
Industry, in such a manner as to ensure effective
carriage of Nigerian’s sea borne trade in volume and
value by recognised Nigerian carriers

(b)

All aspects of commercial shipping especially those
relating to cargo sharing, ship procurement, freight
rates etc.

(c)

Monitoring allocation of cargo among the indegenous
and foreign ships operating within Nigerian*
territorial waters

O

A2

(d)

Activities of shipping conferences

(e)

Operation of clearing and forwarding agents,
shipping agents, chandlers etc. in areas
where they affect the implementation.of this
policy.

Looking at this Legislation, one can judge that had it
been implemented, it would have gone a long way to
enhance the balance of payment position of the country.
Nigeria spends billions of Naira on shipments on
•tf

foreign lines, and if they could carry a larger propor
tion of their own trade, there would be savings.

In

the U.K - West Africa Conference, Nigeria cargo accounts
for

of the overall trade (table 2,2) yet the bulk of

the cargo goes to U.K flag ships (table 3,2),

The situa

tion is even worse in the Continent - West Africa
Conference where no pooling arrangements exist,

2,1.5

Despite the fact that the Ivory Coast, Ghana and other
West African countries hope to make their freight booking
centres work in their favour, it has come under severe
criticism from European Lines, who feel that they are
going to be cut off in the West African trade, which they
have dominated for years.

One does not, however under

stand the fears of the European Lines because in the
first place. Article

47 of the code categorically states

9
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"Each contracting party shall take such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary to implement the
present convention”.

Secondly, wherever there is the

freight booking system there exist a waiver system
which sort of allocate cargo to other lines when
national flag vessels are not available.

Normally,

when the 40^ target is achieved^ the waiver system is
supposed to work effectively..

It should be concluded that, the desire of most develop
»c

ing countries to set up freight Bureau is just an
attempt to consolidate their 40^ of their trade and
not an attempt to control the whole trade.

a

44

REFERENCES
1. CONFERENCE REP, OFFICE

; ”The Liner Conference
System in West Africa"
(Lagos June 1972)

2. UALENTE, rO.-G.

: The Participation of
Developing countries in
shipping (New York 1971)

3. AUDER-nONSEF A,

: "Optimum Transport Service
for Developing Countries
(Rotterdam 1971)

■*

4. CONTAINERISATION INTERNATIONAL: Flay 1980 Edition
5. UKliiAL STATISTICS

: 1976 - 1983

6„ CENTRAL FREIGHT BUREAU

: CFB, A Comprehensive
Service to Tanzanian
Shippers in the Flovement
of the cargo (Dar-es-Salaam
1983)

7. GHANA SHIPPERS' COUNCIL

: Draft Amendment Law (1983)

8. THE SHIPPING POLICY OF NIGERIA: The basic facts the
commercial and shipping
public should know
(Lagos 1981)
9. COWAC STATISTICS

: 1976 - 1983

•>

45

CHAPTER THREE

3.1

GENERAL OUERUIEUI OF LINER SHIPPING IN liJEST AFRICA

3.1.1 CONFERENCES SERUIIMG THE UJEST AFRICAN REGIOM

As many as nine liner conferences operate between West
Africa and Europe^ Asia and America, the major ones being
the Continent - West Africa Conference with its Head
quarters in Hamburg (Northern Section) and Paris

.«

(Southern Section), and having over twenty members;
United Kingdom - West Africa Lines Service with its
Headquarters in London with a membership of eight; and
Mediterranean Europe - West Africa Conference with
Headquarters in Marseilles and membership of sixteen.
(See table 3.1 for a full list of conferences serving
West Africa).

3.1.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM - WEST AFRICA JOINT SERVICE (UKWAL)

UKWAL with its Headquarters in Liverpool has a membership
of eight shipping lines, three from U.K, one from
Continent and four from West Africa.

(Table 3,2).

UKWAL

is the only Conference operating to West Africa which
practices the pooling of cargo and revenue.

The big

lines (by percentage cargo share) are the Elder Dempster
Line (U.K) and Nigeria National Shipping Line (Nigeria).
Percentage share of each line is determined by the

contribution of the Line's country's cargo in the pool,
that is why we see that Nigeria which contributes about
85%

of the whole pool cargo gets 31,.5^ for her National

line, NNSL.

Presently the trade is sort of shared on

bilateral basis, with the UK Lines getting almost 50%,
This situation is bound to change with the coming into
force of the UNCTAD Code, and the steps being taken by
West African lines will be discussed in the next chapter,.

TABLE 3,1
CONFERENCES SERVING WEST AFRICA

Conference

Head
Office

No. of
flembers
from Deve
loping
countries

No. of
Members
from Deve
loping,
countries

1, Continent-West
Africa Conference
Northern Section

Hamburg

Southern Section

Paris

8

19

2. U,K-West Africa
Service

Liverpool

4

4

3. fled. Europe-West
Africa Conference

Plarseilles

7

g

4, America-West
Africa Conference

New York

3

10

5. West Africa-South
Africa Conference

Durban.

—

8

B, West Africa-Far
East Conference
Angola/Cameroon
Range

Tokyo

1

7

7, West Africa-Far
East Conference
Nigeria/Senegal
Range

Tokyo

3

6
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8, Associated CentralWest Africa Lines

Antwerp

2

6

9, US Great Lakes St.
- Lawrence River PortsWest Africa Agreement

New York

2

3

SOURCE:

CRDNER'S WORLD DIRECTORY:- CONFERENCES (1982)

TABLE 3.2
PIEf^lBERSHIP OF UKWAL AND PERCENTAGE SHARE
OF T'lEnBERS IN CARGO POOL (AS AT 31/11/84)
Share

Line

Country

1, Elder Dempster/Guinea Gulf

U.K

35.464

2, Palm Line

U.K

14.495

3. Nigeria National Shipping
Line

Nigeria

31.501

4. Black Star Line

Ghana

7.723

5. c.n.z

Zaire

1.159

6. SITRAF!

Ivory Coast

3.460

7, Hoegh

Norway

6.198

SOURCE:

%

UKWAL SECRETARIAT, LIVERPOOL

3.1.3 CONTINENT WEST AFRICA CONFERENCE (COWAC)

Cowac is divided into two sections, the Northern and
Southern Section.

The Northern Section covers- trade from

the North Cape/Belgium range and is based in Hamburg and
operates a Deutsch Mark tariff.

The Southern Section
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includes ports in the Dunkirk/Bayonne range, and is based
in Paris and has a French Franc tariff.

This division can

be viewed as a reflection of Europe's historical links
with West Africa and particularly the former colonial
structure,

French tariff is geared particularly to the

so-called Francophone territories,

Cowac is looked at by most shipping lines as a "loose”
conference where even tariff is not strictly adhered to,
with a lot of "under cutting" of freight rates.
probably due to the size of the conference.
not held on regular basis.

This is

Meetings are

For instance since 1980 the

first time a Principals' Meeting was held was 1983 in'
Hamburg, unlike in the UKWAL where Principals' Meetings
are held almost every quarter (March, June, September,
December ).

TABLE 3.3
MEMBERSHIP OF COWAC
Line

Country

Cameroon* Shipping Lines

Cameroon

Companie Maritime des
Chargeurs Reunis

F ranee

Companie Beninoise de
Navigation

Benin

Companie Maritime Beige

Belgium

Companie de Navigation Denis
Freres

F ranee

Woerman Line

West Germany

East Asiatic Company

Denmark

Estonian Shipping Company

U.S.S.R

9
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Line

Country

Elder Dempster Lines

U.K

Guinea Gulf Line

U.K

Hoegh Lines

Norway

Nedlloyd

Holland

B ,\J

Palm Line

U.K

Polish Ocean Lines

Poland

SITRAfl

Ivory Coast

SDTDNAM

Togo

SNTM

Gabon

Delmas Uieljeux

F ranee

Cosenam

Senegal -

Nigeria National Shipping
Line

Nigeria

Black Star Line

Ghana

Scandinavia West Africa Line

Sweden '

V.E.B Deutfracht Seereederci

East Germany

SOURCE; COWAC AGREEHENT

3.2 NIGERIA AND LINER LINKS WITH WEST AFRICA

As mentioned elsewhere, Nigeria is a vital generator of
business for liner shipping companies operating to West
Africa, even for those French operators who traditionally
have concentrated on former colonial territories, the
so called Francophone countries,

Nigeria traditionally

accounts for some 60^ of cargoes carried from the
Hamburg/Antwerp range in the ships of Cowac (Northern

&
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section).

Even in the Southern section, Nigeria has

represented about a third of total business.

Trading links with Nigeria since 1982/83 have been
dominated by the upheavals in Nigeria.

The Nigerian

problems stem principally from oil price movements.
Recession in the industrialised world coupled with
changes on the supply side have dramatically reduced
demand for OPEC crude at official price levels.
result has been plummeting revenues.

The

At the start of

1981, Nigeria was producing something like 2 million
barrels of oil a day.

By the middle of the year, output

has dropped to about 700,000)barrels a day.

At the end

of the year Nigeria was producing at around 800,000
barrels a day.

Central Bank foreign reserves were

estimated to be around ^1 billion - enough to cover only
a month's imports and arrears were continuing to mount
towards international crisis levels.

These developments have had their effects in the liner
shipping business.

UKUJAL for example reckons that trade

was running at around 60% below the 1981 level ever since.
Similar problems prevail in the Continental trades.

As

mentioned, Nigeria accounts for some 60% of Cowac Northern
Section Cargoes and about 85% of UKlilAL cargoes.

The impact of the Nigerian difficulties in shipping links
was jerky.

The initial crunch came in March 1982 when the

country's central bank announced a clampdown by embargoing
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letters of credit and suspending the

form” system

governing imports and the release of foreign exchange.
Accompanying the documentary moves was a list of import
restrictions designed to control trade in goods manufac
tured by Nigeria.

Given the vagaries of the trade and

the tendency of the Nigerian government to impose curbs
without any warning, it is not surprising that liner links
were, and are, in a state of tumoil.

Each shipping

company has its own list of horror stories to tell.

Shipping companies with Nigerian involvement have reacted
to the market conditions in two basic ways.

One course of

action has been to try to maintain schedules, carrying on
basically as though

nothing had happened.

The alternative

response has been to tailor the sailing schedule and
service frequency to the level of demand.

This has caused

some bunching, particularly at deadline times, followed
by longer periods of greatly reduced activity,.

Operators

adopting the latter course argue that they are meeting
the needs of the market in that development has to be
flexible, given the trading conditions.

Efforts have also been made to bring the tonrrage employed
into line with the reduced trade flows.

Companies owning

ships have been laying vessels up or seeking to switch
them to other trades via the charter market.

Charter

specialists have been reducing their exposure by tonnage
for shorter periods,.

British trade links with West Africa, of course, are

<»
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dominated by Nigeria,

During this period, UKU/AL was

affected by the economic disruptions in' the country to
a considerable extent.*

At the start of the period, 10

or 11 vessels were leaving U.K each month.
dropped to 5 or 6, and is still falling..

This has
UKWAL runs its

ships on three basic rotations, two of which serve Lagos/
Apapa,.

The reduction in the number of sailings has been

accompanied by an increase in the range of discharge ports
visited.

Thus since 1982, UKWAL has ceased to schedule

ships directly through to Lagos/Apapa and instead, had
grafted on- calls before the Nigerian capital*

An increase

in the number of U.K ports served on individual voyages is
being noted,

3.3 OUTSIDER ACTIVITIES IN UlEST AFRICA'

In spite of the problems of the Nigerian market, a number
of "outsider” lines (Lines not belonging to conferences)
have been operating and their number increasing.

These

include Afea Star Line, which is offering a monthly
container/conventional service from the North Continent
and U,K.

Afea is a substantial Far Eastern Shipowner irr

its own. right,.

A' second contender is Hayling Sea Line, again with far
Eastern connections.

The Hamburg/Antwerp range plus

Felixstowe (UK) are ports served using chartered vessels
in the 15000 DliJT class.

0
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OT Africa Line (DIAL) operates a classic Ro-Ro service
from North continent, France, and the U.K,

Catering for

the full cargo spectrum, the non-conference line is a
joint venture involving the Antrak Group, Cross Marine
Services, and Stena Line,

North European calls include

Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Zeebrugee, Hamburg and Le Havre,
In West Africa, OTAL vessels proceed directly to Lagos/
Apapa, followed by Tema, Lome, Cotonou, Douala and li/arri.

Another Ro-Ro operator (non-conference) in. the market is
Matina Lines,

Formerly run by the Labaid group out of

Rotterdam Matina specialises in rolling cargoes - in cars,
vans, trucks and trailers,

Harwich, Rotterdam and Antwerp

are served by this non-conference operator.

Ports served

in West Africa are Lagos/Apapa, Tema, Douala and Cotonou
with other destinations subject to inducement,

Siosa-Grimaldi also offers a non-conference service out of
the U,K and Antwerp to Lagos/Apapa,.

Vessels usually

proceed from Southampton to Lagos/Apapa via Tema,

Transit

times for the last named port are between 13-18 days,

Medafrica Line offers a container only link supported by
a multi-purpose operation.

Calls are made at Hamburg,

Rotterdam, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Liverpool, Felixstowe and
Ipswich,

Lagos/Apapa is the principal destination.

The established non-conference carrier Europe Africa Line
(EAL) based in Bremen calls at Lagos/Apapa as a port of
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a routeing which includes Dakar, Abidjan, Lome, Warri and
Douala,

Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Rouen

are the normal loading ports,

*

Another major non-conference operator is Golden Liberty
Line, whose operation is based on the cargo generated by
the Nigerian/Indian trading group' which controls it.

Three

ships in the 7500 DliJT/226 TEU class are employed one owned
and two chartered,

GLL serves Antwerp, Harwich and Hamburg,

In Nigeria the service is concentrated on Lagos/Apapa although through-transport is available to Kano, and Kaduna
for container traffic,

3,4 CO-OPERATION AKiONG LINES OPERATING TO liJEST AFRICA

With the exception of Ghana^s Black Star Line and Ivory
Coast's SITRAl'l, all West Africa Shipping lines have some
sort of relationship with one European Line or the other,

Camship (Cameroon) is

3 owned by a West German Company

so there is the German influence as far as management is
concerned.

Comapnie Maritime Zairoise (CMZ) of Zaire is

managed by Companie Maritime Belgoise (CMB) of Belgium
and are even represented at Conference Meetings by CMB
officials.

Senegal's COSENAM (yet to own a ship) is

controlled by Delmas Uieljeux of France,

Cobenam of

Benin is controlled by Societfe Navale de I'Ouest (SNO) of
France,

SOTONAM of Togo are controlled by-Woerman Line

of West Germany.

Infact all SOTONAM vessels are manned

a
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by West Germans (except ratings),

SOWOTRAM of Gabon is

also in the hands of Delmas Uieljeux while Nigeria Green
Lines is aligned to Woerman Line.

Nigeria National Shipping Lines (NNSL) operates a
"conference within a conferenca" with Palm Line, Elder
Dempster and Hoegh Lines.
NEPH group.

This group is know as the

They operate both in the COWAC and in the

UKWAL and on most occasions take common stand at
Conference meetings.

On the other side of the trade, CflB (Belgium^^ Nedlloyd
(Holland), Delmas Vieljeux (France), Denin Freres (France)
and Woerman Line (West Germany) operate a joint service
within COWAC and other trades,-

3.5 CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN’CONFERENCES AND SHIPPERS

The growth of awareness of the need for regular consulta
tions between shipper and shipowner at representative
level is of comparatively recent origin and, with isolated
exceptions, no sustained attempt seems.to have been made
by either party to join discussions at an adequate level
of representation until 1983 when a meeting of Flinisters
of Western European Governments, predominantly the tradi
tional maritime countries, projected the topic into the
forum of international debate, albeit initially centred
on Europe and focussed upon the structure and practices
of European based shipping conferences and the collective
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needs of the shippers they serve.

Prior to this in the

West Africa trade and elsewherej there hady of course
existed for many years innumerable trade arrangements
satisfactory to both parties so that apart from the
constant, often almost day to day, contact between an
individual shipowner and his regular customers which
was and continues to be essential if'business is to be
conducted to the mutual advantage, there existed, and
obviously must exist, methods of communication and con
sultation between shipowners represented jointly by
their conferences and trade associations with sectional
interests in a particular area of the trade served,.

What was lacking was the larger forum, or more specifically
the will and organisation to bring it into existence, for
the ventilation of problems, the examination of grievances
and the framing of policy agreements on a national scale,
ultimately on'international scale.

Whilst shipowners are

sometimes blamed for this deficiency,, which a decade later
and viewed in the present climate of opinion does seem
extraordinary, it is only fair to observe that any dialogue
requires two parties and it is surjely the responsibility of
each party to look to their own arrangements for representa
tion* and to provide adequate mandate for those nominated or
selected for the task.

Shipowners had long since provided

themselves with the means of representation and joint
decision in the form of their liner conferences which had
proven effective and beneficial for the regulation of their
own affairs but, whilst recognising the need for consultation
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with their customers at a comparable representational
level of authority and influence, conferences could no
more consult in the then prevailing vacuum than could
they initiate a counter balancing movement on the part
of shippers and trade associations collectively,

3..5.1 THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL
AND
W EST
AFRICAN STATES

This body was set up in 1975 by 25 member countries from
West and Central Africa with the following objectiv,ps;

(1)

To bring together all the 25 nations constituting
the West and Central Africa region and to formu
late common maritime policies to safeguard their •
interests

(2)

Through resolutions, to press for
(a)

The ratification and the taking of measures
for safeguarding the Code of Conduct for
Liner conferences

(b)

The formation of National Shippers^ Councils
and the joint negotiation of freight rates
through the Freight Negotiating Committee

’ (c)

Integration of the Ports Management
Association of West/Central Africa in the
structure of the Ministerial Conference

(d)

Co-operation agreements between national
shipping lines/companies of member states
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(e)

Harmonisation of maritime laws and bilateral
and multilateral agreements of member states

(f)

Improvement of action undertaken in favour of
landlocked countries.

There are three main organs of the Ministerial Conference,
namely:

-

The Regional Negotiating Committee

-

Ports Management Association of West/Central Afric^

-

Association of National Shipping Lines

Of the three bodies, it is only the Regional Negotiating
Committee which has been functioning effectively, although
of late (since 1983) attempts are being made to make the
Association of National Shipping Lines a reality, with
series of meetings taking place, mainly on the initiative
of Mr, Ahibe, the General Manager of SITRAM, who is also
the Chairman' of the Continent-West Africa Conference
(COWAC), Northern- section.

One of the objectives of the

Association is to take a common stand at Conference Dleetings
and also to forster cordial relations between the National
Lines of the region,

3.5.2 THE REGIONAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE

This body is commonly known as the African Negotiating
Committee (ANC) and perhaps it can be said that the
continued existence of the Ministerial Conference has been

9

59

because of the hard work of this committee, which has
since its inception been negotiating freight rates With
the various conferences operating to West and Central
Africa on behalf of Governments of the 25 member
countries, and also shippers in these countries.

Apart

from general freight rates, the Committee negotiates the
following on behalf of shippers;

“

Port congestion surcharges

-

Port additionals (imposed on ports by conferences
for alledged unproductivity)

-

Availability of Conference tariffs.and regulations

-

Introduction of and alterations in shippers’^
contracts and agreements

-

Bill of Lading conditions in respect of containers

-

Route diversions

-

flinimum advance notice of increases in freight rates

-

r^ethods of charge for heavy and long lifts

-

Freight rate adjusting methods following currency
devaluations or revaluations

-

Special freight rates for the various Marketing
Boards in the region, for instance the Ghana Cocoa
Marketing Board, Nigeria Palm Board and Sierra Leone
Produce Board.

Praises can be showered on the Negotiating Committee in
the sense that for the past three years, freight rate
increases in the sub region has been minimal compared
to the era before they started working.

Currently, they

hav/e managed to freeze any freight increase on the
America-West Africa trade for some time.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE POSITION OF GHANA'S LINER SHIPPING

Although this paper is devoted to the whole West
African sub-region's liner shipping, I am devoting
this chapter to Ghana's liner shipping, in order to
isolate Ghana's 'position, as far as the code of
conduct is concerned and attempt to find out whether
the code will be beneficial to Ghana's liner shipping,
Mr

especially to her National Line, Black Star Line,

A.l
Ghana's Liner shipping scene is dominated by the State
Shipping Corporation, Black Star Line to some extent,
although foreign lines play an important role in the
foreign trade of the State, and a number of smaller
Ghanaian liner companies have fairly recently also
entered the scene, mainly on the Continent and United
Kingdom to West Africa route.

The smaller Ghanaian

liner companies are Remco Lines, Kadas Lines and Unity
Star Line (yet to acquire a vessel of its own).

The bulk of Ghana's foreign trade is moved through the
Tema port, a modest and shrinking share passing through
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the Port of Takoradi,

The bulk of the trade between Ghana and the United
Kingdom, North Continent, the Mediterranean and
USA is organised in conferences with Ghana's largest
National Line, Black Star Line (BSL) being a member
of all these conferences.

The other three national

lines operate as outsiders,.

4.1.1 GHANA'S TRADE UITH NORTH CONTINENT

This trade is organised through the Continent - West
Africa Conference (COWAC), with BSL as a member.

Black

Star Line's percentage share in this trade (AntwerpHamburg range to West Africa) averages about

2%

while

in the trade to Ghana, the Line carries about 38^
(see table 4.1),

The Line's share in the total trade

is however small, due to the fact that it operates
mainly in the Antwerp-Hamburg range, not calling at
Scandinavian ports and also Baltic ports,

A look at

table 4,2 will show that apart from the Antwerp-Hamburg
range, cargoes move from Scandinavia (carried mainly by
E.A.C, Line) and the Baltic (carried by the Eastern bloc
lines) to Ghana,

A substantial amount of cargoes moving

between. French ports and Ghana are carried on Black
Star Line vessels,.
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TABLE 4,.I

COliiAC SOUTHBOUND (AiMTUERP HAFIBURG RANGE hJEST AFRICA) (IN FREIGHT TONNES)
B
TO GHANA

A
TOTAL CDUJAC
1979
BSL
1980
BSL
1981
BSL

2,026,-050

112,010 ( 5.-5%)

93,860

65,215 (58.2 )

2,407,000

88,665 ( 3.7 )

34,065

24,37® (27.5 )

2,742,630

113,070 ( 4.1 )

51,985 (1.9^)
2,325,340

1982
BSL
1/
1983( '2)

23,070 (1.0%)
847,660

BSL

8,470 (1,0%)

35,160 (31.1 )
47,750 ( 2.1 )
18,475 (38.7 )
23,965 ( 2.8 )
8,470 (35.3 )

SOURCE; COUAC STATISTICS 1979-83 (COIMF. SECRETARIAT)

In the export shipments, on paper, about 80% of Ghana's
cocoa are to go on BSL vessels but in practice this is
not the case.

The sole exporter of cocoa, Ghana Cocoa

Marketing Company is by legislation, to use Black Star
Line vessels for ports in Europe covered by the Line
but due to reasons which cannot be discused in this
paper, less than 40% of the cocoa goes on Black Star
Line vessels,-

Table 4,3 shows the trend from

1981-1983,

TABLE A.3

GHAIMA-NDRTH CONTINENT AND BALTIC TRADE (IN TONNES)

COCOA
1981

COU/AC
BSL

1982

COliJAC
BSL

1983( V 2 ) COWAC
BSL

SOURCE:

86,775

PRODUCTS
7,165

25,155(29^) 3,620(50%)
107,730

20,500

42,100(39%) 1,020(5%)
32,320
8,000(25%)

670
190(28%)

LOGS
27,655
685(2%)
21,195

TIMBER

OTHERS

TOTAL

8,810

14,530

144,935

-

-

8,965

7,025

-

-

5,570

2,165

-

ANNUAL STATISTICS, BLACK STAR LINE,. HAMBURG

—

29,460(20%)

50
1,200

165,415
43,170(26%)
41., 925
. 8,190(20%)

TABLE A.2
COWAC SOUTHBOUND TO GHANA

SCANDINAVIA^^^

BALTIC^(2)''

ANTWERP/HArOBURG

TOTAL

FRANCE

1979

5425WT/6975FT

1555WT/29A5FT 58,255WT/112010FT

B22501JJT/121925FT

BB30U1T/7925FT

1980

3910WT/63B5FT

2600lliT/3770FT 48,090lijT/ 88605FT

54B00UJT/98795FT

14970WT/17470FT

1981

3315UJT/A1A5FT

5150UJT/15090

57145WT/132305FT

4250WT/5735FT

1982

1735U)T/2805FT

34l5UiT/75Q5FT 22,715UJT/47750FT

1/
1983( '2)

1086UJT/1390FT

48,180UJT/113070FT

278B5UiT/580BOFT

B82UiT/l304FT
%

4660UJT/11170FT..11565UJT/23965FT

1,

Carried mainly by EAC Line

2.

Carried by Eastern Bloc Lines

SOURCE:

17300WT/3B52FT

ANNUAL STATISTICS - BLACK STAR LINE REPRESENTATIVES OFFICE, HAMBURG

43UiT/3B525FT
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4.1.2 GHAI\iA-U,K TRADE

This trade is conducted through the United KingdomWest Africa Lines Conference (UKWAL) of which Black
Star Line is a founding member.

In this conference,

there exist a Pooling Arrangement.

Each member-line

has a percentage share in the pool, which is revised
from time to time.

The share of individual lines is

determined by the contribution of the member linens*
country's trade in the pool.,

As already mentioned in

previous chapters, this trade is basically, a U.KNigeria affair, as about 85^ of the cargoes are
destined for Nigerian ports.

Ghana^s contribution,

despite its volume (7.5^ in 1984) compared to that of
Nigeria is the second in the pool.

(See table 4.4),

Black Star Line's percentage share in the pool, in the
years preceeding the coming into force of the UNCTAD
code was 7.7^.

It used to be 9.9^ in 1976.

In nay

1985, at a Principals' Meeting held in Copenhagen,
Denmark, shares of Member Lines were reviewed to be in
line with the UNCTAD's sharing formula of 40:.40;20,
Black Star Line's share was slashed to 4.29%, a result
of the adherence to the code's cargo sharing principles,

4.1.3 NON-CONFERENCE ACTIUITIES

Like in the Nigerian Liner trade, Ghana's liner trade is

^.4 UK-.Ii;EST AFRICA FREIGHT TONNAGE 1982-198^
SOUTHBOUND

NORTHBOUND

1982

1983

1984

3,525

4,242

3,217

10,984

2,939

4,240

2,747

9,926

Gambia

11,907

11,902

11,169

34,978

30

149

12

191

Sierra Leone

20,990

14,451

20,052

55,493

3,958

4,563

6,954

15,475

TOTAL

1982

1983

1984

TOTAL
0

Senegal

Guinea

mm

-

-

Liberia •

11,165

8,735

7,338

27,238

829

394

474

1,697

Ivory Coast

14,310

10,650

14,786

39,746

95,124

88,663

46,666

230,453

44,307

40,818

44,332

129,457

67,555

44,336

43,700

155,591

8,148

5,748

7,407

21,303

243

22

Ghana
Togo
Benin
Nigeria
Cameroon-

10,010

5,995

2,236

18,241

908

889,536

538,976

448,363

1,876,875

71,513

23,775

14,215

15,879

53,869

11,948

Equitorial Guinea

-

Gabon;

265

-

-

25

933

83,556

61,616

216,685

11,620

4,490

28,058

3,586

15,073

-

-

144

2,686

2,352

5,182

Republic of Congo

1,966

1,709

1,069

4,744

6,740

4,747

Zaire

8,289

3,596

-

11,885

3,778

3,387

%

Angola

-

7,165
CD

-

1,048,072

—

663,723

SOURCE; UKWAL SECRETARIAT, LIVERPOOL
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______766

578,966

2,290,761

~
265,565

-

245,677

-170,270

CO
>•

681,612
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to some extent, characterised by non-conference liner
activities.

This is mainly due to the fact that Black

Star Line limits its liner activities to U,K Ports
(Liverpool, London, Avonmbuth, Dublin) and ports within
the Antwerp-Hamburg range in the North Continent, plus
some French ports.

In this situation, all cargoes

originating from other ports, such as the Far East,
America and Mediterranean move on non-conference vessels,
(BSL ceased operating to the USA and Mediterranean from
1980).

Non-conference operators active in Ghana include;

(1)

0,T,. Africa Line

(2)

Gulf Maritime

(3)

Remco Line

(а )

A’fea Line

(5)

Gold Star Line

(б)

Zim Line

The last three lines, Afea, Gold Star and Zim lines
operate mainly from the Far East while the others load
from other U.K and continental ports not served by Black
Star Line»

A»1«A THE CODECS EFFECTS ON BSL LINER OPERATIONS

One of the main objectives of the code is to help lines
from developing countries participate in the carriage of
their own external trade.

However, the benefits to be
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realised out of this new order varies from country to
country.

For instance, let us take a look at some

category of lines and how their benefits vary.

Let us

group shipping lines in these three categories:

(a)

Line from developing countries with a big volume
of trade with insufficient tonnage,

(Nigeria is

an example of such a country, uiith her major
National line, Nigeria National Shipping Line
falling into this group)
(b)

Lines from countries with vessels just sufficient
to carry the country's external trade,.

(The

Ivory Coast and her National line, SITRAfO, fall
in this group)
(c)

Lines from countries with surplus tonnage; i,-e
their volume of trade is so low that her own
vessels have to find business elsewhere.

Black Star Line obviously falls within the third group,
as from available statistics, it is evident that Ghana's
foreign trade has been on a very low side for some years
now.

For instance, Ghana's contribution (imports) to the

UKWAL cargo pool has decreased substantially -from 173,198
tonnes in 1974 to 44,332 tonnes in 1984, a decrease of 74%
(table 4..5)*

In 1974, BSL had 16 (sixteen) general breakbulk vessels
of about 10,800 DWT each.

Around the same period 4 (four)

16,001] DliiT multi-purpose vessels with a 500 TEU carrying
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TABLE 4.5

GHANA

TOTAL

PERCENTAGE

1974

173,198

1,417,,996

12.2

1975

144,198

1,680,464

CD
•
CD

1976

181,131

1,842,713

CO
«
CO

1977

184,907

2,153,286

CD
.
CD

GHANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO UKWAL POOL
1974-1984 (IN TONNES)

1978

153,426

1,658,002

9.3

1979

90,390

1,052,043

8,6

1980

102,258

1,510,249

6.8

1981

78,658

1,514,476

5.2

1982

44,307

1,048,072

4.2

1983°

40,818

663,723

6.1

1984°

44,332

578,966

7.6

o
Decrease in total attributed to drastic austerity
measures taken by government of Nigeria from 1983
to control imports, in the wake of decreasing oil
revenues.
SOURCE;

UKWAL STATISTICS 1974-1984 (CONF. SECRETARIAT)

capacity were ordered from the Hyondai Shipyard, South Korea
In 1980, the line had 20 (twenty) vessels, but today the
situation is very different.

Only the four multi-purpose

vessels and three of the general breakbulk vessels are

*
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trading today, with the multi-purpose vessels employed
mainly in the open-market leaving the three old ones to
do the liner service.

As and when the line gets a slot

in the UKWAL pool, one of the multi-purpose vessels is
withdrawn from charter to do the liner run.

The rest of

the vessels were sold between 1981 and 1984,

This un

fortunate situation has been the direct result of Ghana^s
decreasing foreign trade,

Black Star Line was formed in 1957, with a foresight to
carry the trade of all West African countries.

This was

exactly what happened from 1957 to the late 1970's when
other countries in' the region started forming their own
shipping lines.

As the first indegenous line in Africa,

South of the Sahara desert, BSL dominated the liner scene
in West Africa with regular sailings between West Africa
and U.K Continental Europe,. USA/Canada and the Mediterranean,
Her vessels had full employment, each performing on the
av.erage about 5 (five) sailings inr a year between West Africa
and the ports mentioned.

At times, additional tonnage were

chartered to supplement the lines fleet.

The coming into force of the Liner Code of Conduct has
compounded the problems of Black Star Line, instead of
being beneficial to the Line.

For instance in the UKWAL

Conference, as mentioned earlier, the share of the line
before the code came into force was 7.7^ but from May 1985
her share has been slashed to 4.2^, after basing the
sharing on the UNCTAD formula.

So long as the Conference

0
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uses a member lines country's contribution in the trade
to determine shares, the only way BSL's share laill
increase will be Ghana's contribution in the pool
increasing, that is, improuement in her foreigrr trade.
Currently 40^ of the country's contribution to the pool
comes to only

(1984 figures).

In Couac, the pooling system does not exist, but the
situation is not different from that in UKUJAL as far as
BSL's participation is concerned.

Almost all West Africa

countries whose trade are covered by the conference now
have their national fleet, and as such efforts are being
made by their "appropriate authorities" to commandeer 40^
of their trade to their ships.

Invariably, in the

Francophone West African countries notably. Ivory Coast,
Cameroon and Gabon, it is becoming increasingly impossible
for third flag lines to participate in their trade, as they
have the "a priori" control of cargo which by legislation,
sees to it that all government cargoes go to their National
fleet.

Apparently, all these countries have bilateral

trade agreements with France, which makes it possible for
their trade to be carried on French vessels and on their
vessels.

As a result, for some time now, BSL vessels

from the continental ports have to be contended with the
little cargo going to Ghana, and at times few parcels for
Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

The vessels are curren'tly

operating from the Continent at about 50% capacity.

Whilst Ghana's imports are going to be the same as they
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are now for at least the next few years, a way of keeping
the national fleet in business in the wake of problems
being faced as a consequence of the introduction of the
code will be to ensure through legislation, that all
government cargoes which do not go on’ Conference lines
and are as such outside the scope of the code are carried
on national vessels,.

A substantial amount of bulk wheat, maize, rice, machinery
and other import licence covered cargoes are imported into
the country by the Ghana National Procurement AgencyiJ'
(GNPA),

Because the importation are on CIF basis, the

suppliers nominate their own vessels.

As stated earlier

on, the code does not cover cargoes not carried by
conference.

These GNPA imports are carried outside the

conferences and as such nothing stops the Government, if
it so desires, to ensure that all such imports are on
FOB basis,.

This will enable her national line have some

thing to carry outside her conference operations.

Now, should one ask "why should Ghana be the first country
in the world to ratify the code when it appears that her
liner shipping, at its present state, will not benefit from
the new order", what should be the answer be?

When examining the feasibility and desirability of Ghana's
adherence to the code, a step which may appear not to be
beneficial to the country's liner shipping, at least at her
present state, several aspects must be scrutinized. Probably

76

&

the best answer to this question is that Ghana is not in
a position of being able to exercise superior economic
power over any of its trading partners, as the EEC or
COMECON countries can do with theirs.

In this light, the

only thing to do is to follow the bandwagon and adhere to
the provisions of the code and just hope that her economy
picks up,.

When this happens, her national line will reap

the benefits of the code.

Apart from the recommendations given in the previous page,
other steps could be taken to boost Ghana s contribution
in the UKWAL pool and also get more cargo for national
vessels from the continent.

In the U.K trade, a lot of "Outsiders” carry Ghana's
trade as earlier stated.

The Ghana Shippers' Council, the

"Appropriate Authority" for the code in Ghana can ensure
that all cargoes going to Ghana from U.K are channelled
into the UKWAL pool.

Figures are not available but it is

known that a substantial amount of cargoes are shipped on
outsider vessels.

If all these cargoes could be diverted

into the UKWAL pool, Ghana's contribution in the pool will
increase, thereby increasing Black Star Line's share in the
pool.

In the Continent—Ghana trade, Cowac does not have any pooling
arrangement and what members carry depend, to a large extent
on the Lines own marketing strength.

Black Star Line can
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increase its marketing activities in the continent in
order to obtain more cargoes for her vessels.

Secondly,

Ghana Shippers' Council can open an office in both
London arrd Hamburg to monitor all cargoes going to Ghana,
Most West African countries Shippers' Councils are
doing this, and is helping their national lines a lot.

««
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CHAPTER FIUE

UJHAT IS HAPPENING IN COliJAC AND UKUJAL AS A
RESULT OF THE C0P1ING INTO FORCE OF THE CODE

As mentioned in Chapter 3, shipping companies have
reacted to the Nigerian economic crisis and its effects
on Liner Shipping in West Africa in. two basic ways,
trying to maintain schedules by carrying on as if nothing
had happened; and tailoring schedules and service
frequency to the level of demand.

When it comes to the

effects of the codecs implementation on COWAC and UKWAL
operations, the situation is different,

5.1 nEMBERSHIP

There has been dramatic changes in membership of both
UKWAL and COWAC since the coming into force of the code.
In COWAC, during a Principals' meeting held in November1983 in Hamburg (which I happened to be present), as many
as three new members were admitted into the conference.
Out of the three, two were from Nigeria, namely Great
Britain Nigeria Line (GBN) and Nigeria Green Lines,

Both

Lines' membership were sponsored by the Nigerian Government
with support from Nigeria National Shipping Lines (NNSL),(since the inception of the code, the Government of Nigeria
has been encouraging indegenous private lines to join the
various Conferences operating to the country.

This is seen

as an effort to carry a substantial part of their own trade
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which hitherto was caEcried by foreign lines)..

However,

membership application from a Line in' West Germany was
blocked by member lines from West Germany who insisted
that the current members from West Germany are capable
of carrying the German share of the trade and as such
the membership of the new line should not be entertained.
It will interest the reader to know that in accordance
with the Code's Article 1 on nembership, this new line
satisfied all the membership entrance conditions.

They

even attached to their application a letter from their
"Appropriate Authority", confirming their registration as
a National Line, which automatically qualifies them to be
members of the conference.

This clearly contradicts EEC's

Brussel Package which considers any Line in the community
as a National Line.

It was clear to African I'lembers present at the meeting that
while the Conference (dominated by Lines from Europe) were
eager to admit new members from West Africa, they were not
interested in admitting new members from Europe.

Thus in

effect, while they were particularly careful not to reduce
the share of the trade o.f existing European member lines,
they did not care about that of their West African partners.

In UKWAL, as far as membership is concerned, there has been
a considerable decrease in membership, since the code came
into force.

Prior to the inception of the code, the

Conference had eight members.

Today membership has reduced
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to fiv/e.

In 1984, some feu months after the code came

into force, Hoegh Lines, the only third flag line in the
Conference submitted their notice to withdraw from the
Conference.

Although no reason was giv/en, it was clear

to members that Hoegh Lines feared that their existing
share of the trade (6,1^) will be reduced drastically,
judging from the pronouncements from African Lines who
for years have criticised the 6,1^ share allocated to
Hoegh Lines, a third flag country (African lines like
Cnz and SITRAM whose countries contributed to the pool
had 1,1^ and 3,4?S respectively).

In 1985, prior to a Principals' Meeting held in
Copenhagen to discuss among other things. Members'shares
in the pool, CMZ and SITRAM decided to withdraw from the
Conference as full members.

A look at Table 4.4 shows

that their countries contribution to the pool averages
1,2%

and

2,1%

respectively.

Ivory Coast for instance is

a country adhering strictly to the Code's sharing formula,
and having taken cognisance of the fact that 40^ of their
country's contribution to the pool (2.1^) will be only
0,8^ obviously do not see any justification in their
continued membership of the Conference,

Ivory Coast's

main trading partner is France whose trade is carried by
COWAC and therefore with the coming into force of the code,
their interest lies more in COUiAC than in UKWAL,
situation applies to CMZ of Zaire.

The same

40^ of Zaire's

contribution to the pool comes to 0,5^,

Both lines however
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declared their intentions of remaining in the Conference
only as "dormant" members.

5.2 PARTICIPATION IN TRADE

5.2.1

As stated earlier, COWAC is considered as a "loose"
Conference with no pooling arrangement and specific share
of trade for member lines.

The Secretariat does not

monitor closely activities of member lines.

During the

November 1983 Principals' fleeting, a draft of a new
Conference Agreement was submitted for Members' considera
tion and approval.

All provisions and Articles in this

new. proposed Agreement were discussed and approved, with
the exception of Article 17, dealing with shares in the
trade.

There was a deadlock when this topic was put up

for discussion.

Apparently, European lines had one stand

while the African lines also had their own stand.

On

the eve of the meeting, the African lines had their own
meeting and came up with the following, which was to be
their common stand with regards to Article 17 of the
Agreement.

(l)

Among other things, the African 1‘ines wanted:

To be considered as one group for the purpose of
shares.

They wanted the trade to be divided on

the 40:40:20 basis and their 40^ left to them to
be shared among the Lines from West Africa them
selves,

The Annex to Resolution 1 of the UNCTAD

a
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Code allows this

Here, it is stated in Part B,

Participation in Trade, paragraph 4 that:

"National lines within a Region at one end
are to have the flexibility of adjustments
among themselves in regard to their shares",

(2)

To participate in the
traders.

20%

allocated to cross

It is the wish of African Lines to be

considered as cross traders in each other African
countries trade with Europe.

This means that

after taking their 40% share in their own
country's trade with Europe, they will partici
pate as cross traders in their neighbours trade.

No Agreement was reached at this meeting, so the proposed
new Agreement could not be signed.
to be resolved.

Article 17 was still

A committee was set up comprising six

members;

-

2 Representatives from European National Lines

-

2 Representatives from African Lines

-

2 Representatives from Cross traders

to deliberate on the African proposals and other related
issues and submit their recommendation to the Conference
Secretariat,

To date, the proposed Agreement has not

been signed, as Article 17 still remain unresolved.

<»
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5.2.2

ffs mentioned earlier, UKUJAL members held a Principals'
Meeting in Copenhagen in May 1985, and top on the Agenda
was the re—allocation of members' percentage shares in
the pool.

This was necessary because prior to this, shares

were based on certain criteria, but with the coming into
force of the code, there was the need to base shares on
the UNCTAD formula.

Also there had been the withdrawal

of Hoegh Line, a third flag line, from the Conference, and
SITRAM and CMZ have decided to operate only as”dormant”
members.

Prior to this meeting there had been several meetings to
determine the basis for the new shares.

Apparently this

issue remained unresolved meeting after meeting as
Members could not come to any compromise.

It was general

ly agreed among members that sharing will be based on the
UNCTAD formula but what was never resolved, until the
Copenhagen meeting was whether to base shares on Member
lines' previous years south bound (imports of African
countries) or northbound (export) figures.

Initially all

the U.K lines wanted shares to be based on only one leg
voyage, that is, southbound, while the African lines,
except NNSL wanted shares t.o be based on the entire trade,bJhat has been happening is that the U.K lines usually
returned from West Africa in ballast as they considered
the carriage of the West African exports unprofitable due
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to high loading expenses and long days in port due to low
productivity in these ports.

Thus if their total carriage

is used, their share would be lower than when southbound
alone is used.

This was the opposite to the stand and

position of African lines, especially Black Star Line and
SITRAW, who stand to gain more if both northbound and
southbound figures are used.

WNSL opposed using both

northbound and southbound figures because they knew that
Nigeria's exports have not been as high as their imports,
and as such they stand to loose if both trades are used,
(This is seen in table 5.2).

U.K Lines later, on knowing

the shares were to be based on the UNCTAD principles
became indifferent, as their position will be the same
which ever method is used (See table 5.2).
Nigeria against the rest.

So, it was

They alone wanted shares to be

based on southbound alone.

As they control over B0% of

the trade, obviously their stand could not be overruled
despite the fact that they were alone as against all others.
They made it clear that voting will not decide the issue.
Later, with the withdrawal of CMZ and SITRAM, Black Star
Line's support was lost and as such the Secretariat based
the shares on southbound figures only, thus bowing to the
pressure from NNSL,

Table 5,1 shows the position of members shares now and
prior to the Copenhagen meeting.
new figures were arrived at.

Table 5.2 shows how the

a

8 6

TABLE 5.1
UKWAL POOL SHARES

Previous
Lines

Current

(Before Copenhagen)

(After Copenhagen)

British Lines

50. 00^

53.00%

m SL

31.501

42.72

7.723

4.28

BSL
Others

10.775

.%

100 00

SOURCE:

1 0 0 . ee%

UKliiAL SECRETARIAT

In arriving at the new shares, the Secretariat .based their
calculations on the following:

(1)

British Lines basic interest was assumed at 40%

(2)

The percentage shares of African lines was
restricted to those participating as full members

(3)

The balance after calculating each line's 40% was
split 50:50 between British and African lines ,
with the African lines portion, BSL and NNSL split
between them according to their percentage shares

(4)

No allowance was made for cross-traders.

(The only

cross trader in the Conference, Hoegh Lines withdrew
their membership).
•9
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To begin with, basing calculations on UKWAL trade
figures (southbound) from 1982-198A (table 4,4) after
allocating 40% to British Lines, 40% of Nigeria and
Ghana^s contribution to the pool was calculated as
32,772% and 2,201% respectively.
leaving a balance of 24,995%,

This totalled 75,034%,

This was further shared

50:50 between British Lines and NNSL/BSL according to
each lines percentage share, giving them 11,677% and
0,806% respectively.

This brought the final calculation

to 52.483% for British lines, 3,067% for BSL and 44,450%
for NNSL.

This process was repeated using northbound

figures alone, and again using a combined northbound/
southbound figures.

As it has already been decided that

shares are to be based on southbound only the final
shares ought to have been 52.483% and 44,450% for British
lines, BSL and NNSL respectively, but BSL knowing well
that when a combined northbound/southbound figures are
used will get them 5,513% instead of 3,067% protested,
A compromise solution was found to this.

An average was

struck between the southbound only shares and the
combined northbound/southbound to arrive at the final
agreed shares of 53% for British lines, 4,29% for BSL
and 42.72% for NNSL.

SUr'IlviARY OF THE CALCULATIONS
A, BRITISH LINES^ SHARE
(l)

(Southbound only)

Share in trade (based on UNCTAD formula)

= 40%

50% of balance of 24.966

= 12.483
52,483%

— (1)

i
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(2)

(Combined MB/SB)

Given shares
13.994

50^ of balance of 27,989

53.994% ---(2)
Final Allocated Share (Average of
( 1) ,

( 2) )

53 %

=

B. NNSL SHARE
(1) (Southbound only)
Nigeria's contribution to pool = 81,9% =

81,9%
Ht

40& of contribution

= 32,773

Proportional share in- balance

= 11.677
44.450% ---(1)

(2) (Combined NB/SB)
Nigeria's contribution to pool = 70,4%
40% of contribution

= 28,175

Proportional share in balance

= 12.318
'40.49 3 % ---(2)

Final Allocated share (Average of
(1) (2) )

= 42.72%

C. BSL SHARE
(l) (Southbound only)
Ghana's contribution to pool = 5,65%
40% of contribution

=

2,261%

Proportional share in balance

=

»806
3.067% ---(1)
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(2)

(Combined NB/SB)

Ghana's contribution to pool = 9,58?S
40^ of contribution

=

3,836

Proportional share in. balance

=

1,677
5.513fo---(2)

Final allocated share (Average of
(1 )

(2 )

)

=

4 .2 9 ^

The method used to arrive at the shares should not be
•c

allowed to pass without comment.

All along, the

Secretariat divided the trade between British Lines
and African Lines and excluded cross traders.

This

pre-supposes that shares will be in line with the Annex
to Resolution 1 of the code, Section B, dealing with
Participation in Trade, which calls for Equality of
Rights of national lines at the two ends”.

This means

that the British group and the African group should have
equal rights.

How come then, that, the total share of the

British group is 53^ as to the 47?S of African Lines.

At

least, after calculations, the final figures ought to have
reflected a 50:50 share between the two groups.

Before

the advent of the code, the total share of the British
lines was 50^ while that for African lines and the only
cross trader was 50/o (see table 3,2).

It is therefore

unacceptable that today that the shares are being based on
the UNCTAD formula and provisions which call for "equal
rights", British lines shares should exceed 50^,

A

i

question that may be asked is "why did the African lines
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agree to this?"

Perhaps judging from the figures one

can say that NNSL did not see the need, so long as they
had acquired a substantial increase in their shares
(from 31,501^ to 42,72^).

On BSU^s part perhaps Ghana's

contribution to the pool weakens her bargaining power and
can therefore not be in a position to push harder.

It

would only have been possible with the support of NNSL,
for BSL to challenge the rational behind British lines
share exceeding 50%, but as indicated earlier, NNSL are
better off than they used to be so they will not see the
need to support any challenge put up by BSL,

Another flaw in the shares calculation is why if was
based mainly on southbound figures, and not only on the
entire trade, that is, combined northbound and southbound.
The Conference covers both northbound and southbound
trades and as such there is no justification irr deciding
to base shares on southbound carryings.

It is agreed

that the Conference Pooling Arrangement covers only
southbound trade but this has been the result of British
lines not keen on loading northbound due to the dis
economies inherent in the' northbound trade, and should
have nothing to do with determining members shares in
the trade.

The code, in my opinion, does not only talk

of shares in a Pool but also shares in a Trade.

Shares

should have been based on the entire trade covered by
the Conference and the northbound portion which any line
may refuse to carry put in a pool for member lines who^
want to lift them to do so.

After all, under Annex to

TffBLE 5.2
UKUIAL SHARES
USING 1982-1984 FIGURES
NORTHBOUND
COMBINED
(4)
(5)
(6) I (7) ^ (8)
^ (9)
(3)
( 1)
( 2)
40%
of
%
Balance
%
Total
40%
of
%
Balance
%
Total
40% of % Balance % Total
Cols(7)
Basis
Cols(4) Total
Basis
Total
Basis Cols(l) Total
Col(7)
( 8)
NBj SB
(5)
Col(4)
NB
SB
Col(l)
(2)
SOUTHBOUND

British
Ghana
Nigeria

40«0D0

12,483

2.2B1

0,806

32.773

11.677

75.034

SOURCE:

24.966

53.994

53.GO

3.836

1.677

5.513

4.29

11.103

23.821 28.175

12,318

40.493

42.72

38.150

100.000 72.011

27.989

100,000

100.00

9.132

7.972

44.450 12.718

100.000 61.850
38.150

100.000

100.000

UKWAL SECRETARIAT

13.994

19,075

24.966

Average'
(3) (9)

59.075 40,000

52,483 40,000
3,067

( 10 )

17.104

27.989
100.00
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R e s o lu tio n 1 o f the

code,

S e c t i o n B,

paragraph 3 s ta te s

that:

"If National lines do not carry, or are unable to
carry their allocated share of the trade and on
this point they themselves sKall make the
decision - that PORTION of their share of the
trade which they do not carry will revert to the
pool to be share pro rata".

5. 3

It was mentioned in Chapter A under "The Code's Effects
on BSL Liner Operations" that it is not every Line in
the developing world which will benefit from the code.
What is happening in UKWAL with regards to shares, goes
a long way to trumpet this assertion.

While it has

enhanced the position of NNSL, it has pushed BSL into
an uncomfortable position.

With her shares in the trade

reduced from 1, 1% to 4.29/S the line will no doubt be
thinking about their future as far as Liner Shipping is
concerned, particularly, their continued membership of
the UKWAL Conference,.
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CHAPTER SIX
ASSESSMENT AND C0NCLU5IDN.
6.1. FUTURE OF CONFERENCES OPERATING- TO liJEST AFRICA.
U/e

have already discussed the importance of Nigeria in

Liner Shipping in. West Africa, her cargoes accounting for
some 60% of cargoes carried by the Continent-West Africa
Conference (COWAC) and about 85% of cargoes carried by
the United Kingdom-West Africa Conference (UKWAL). Inva
riably, any conference vessel going to West Africa calls
»«
at one or two ports in Nigeria, We have also discussed
the various bodies being set up by countries in West
Africa to help implement the UNCTAD Code, in an attempt
to make their national lines carry their national trade,
at least 40% as stipulated by the UNCTAD cargo sharing
formula. Cargo reservation or luhat is known as the "a
priori" Control of cargo is being practised v.igorously in
countries like Ivory Coast and Cameroon, where almost all
national cargoes are moved by SITRAM and CAMSHIP respecti
vely, Mention has also been made of the effect of Nigeria^
economic upheavals on COWAC and UKWAL operations, not for
getting also its direct effect on the operations of some
national lines like the Black Star Line (BSL) of Ghana,
From the above, it will therefore seem that the future of
the Conferences operating to West Africa, in the wake of
the coming into force of the Code, depends to a large ex
tent on these two factors :
a) The future of Nigeria^ economy, and

o
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b) What countries in West Africa are going to make
of the bodies set up to implement the Code,
However, it seems that the first point is more related to
UKWAL while the second .is related to CQWAC.
B.1.1 FUTURE OF NIGERIA^:S ECONDIyIY.
One important factor which will determine the future of
the Conferences operating to West Africa is the economic
position of Wigeria, a country whose cargo is the life
blood of these Conferences, As seen in Chapter Three, Ni««

geria% economic,problems starting from 1981 had had disas
trous effect on operations of both COWAC and UKWAL,
UKWAL for example, reckons that currently trade has been
running at around 60^ below the 1981 level, 10 or 11 ves
sels were leaving U,K, each month but now not more than 5
vessels sail a month,
A look at Table 6.1 shows that there has been a direct relation between Nigeria^ imports and the UKWAL trade. From
1981 to 1984 the percentage decrease

in Wigerian imports

carried by UKWAL has been decreasing at the same rate as
that of UKWAL total carryings to West Africa, This cannot
be said of changes in Ghana% figures. For example in 1983
while the percentage decrease for UKWAL and Nigeria were -5B%
&

- 58^ respectively, that for Ghana was -8^. The following

year UKWAL had -62^, Nigeria —65^ but Ghana had an. increase
of +9%, It therefore seems that UKWAL is much dependent on
Nigeria^ foreign trade. As has been mentioned already, the

a
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future of UKWAL as a Conference depends on the future of
Nigeria^ economy. If Nigeria^ foreign trade continues to
fall like is happening now under their so-called "auste-i ,
rity" UKUiAL might cease to be a Conference,
As far as GhanaS position is concerned, there is the ten
dency of UKUiAL becoming a Nigeria-United Kingdom affair.
That is, the Conference is gradually shifting towards a
bi-lateral sort of arrangement. As mentioned earlier,
C,M^Z, (Zaire), SITRAM (Ivory Coast) and Hoegh Lines (Nor
way) have all ceased to be members of the Conference lea
ving it for the U,K, Lines, Nigeria^ N,N.,S,L, and Ghana%
B,S,L, Black Star Linefe percentage share in the cargo pool
has fallen from 7,7^ to 4,3^.
This year by June, the line had finished carrying her per
centage share of the pool with only two sailings (in the
previous year •B,S,L, had four sailings). This means her
vessels will have to seek employment elsewhere for the
rest of the year. It is obvious that if the trend conti-^
nues, there is every possibility that B,S,L, may leave the
Conference, The only thing that can. save the situation is
a substantial increase in Ghanafe imports so as to increase
her con.tribution in the UKWAL cargo pool whic-h. will subse
quently increase B,S,L,^ percentage share of the pool. So
long as the Codes formula is used to decide shares, and
Ghana% imports are not increasing, the only ultimate result
might be the withdrawal of B,S,L, from UKU/AL, leaving the
Conference for the U,K., lines and N.,N,S,L,
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TABLE B.1
UKWAL TRADE FIGURES (-in Tonnes).
YEAR
1981

--- %--- %---CHANG£ GHANA CHANGE
CHANGE NIGERIA
UKWAL
78,658 (-23)
1,514,476 (+0.3) 1,296,149 i + n

1982

1,048,072

(-30)

889,536

(-31)

44,307

(-44)

1983

663,723

(-56)

538,976

(-58)

40,818

(-8)

198A

578,966

(-62)

448,363

(-65)

44,332

(+9)

SOURCE
6 .1 .2

;

UKWAL S E C R E T A R I A T .

IWPLEIviENTaTION OF THE CODE.
»4

How the various countries in West Africa are going to im^
plement the Code, will to a large extent also determine
the future of some of the Conferences operating to the
sub-region. This factor will affect COWAC more than UKWAL.
This because, as mentioned in previous chapters, all the
Francophone countries in West Africa have of late set up
their National Shipping Lines (some are yet to own. a vessel)
and are all members of COWAC (but not UKWAL) due to the
simple reason that their trade is more with France than
with any country. French ports fall within the COWAC range
of ports, with the COWAC Southern Section run from Paris.
We have already discussed the various scheme developed by
countries in. West Africa to help them implement the Code.
It can be seen that in. West Africa the implementation of
the Code is more rigid in the Francophone countries than
in the Anglophone countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia,
Sierra Leone and Liberia). Ivory Coast and Cameroon for
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example adhere to the so-called ”a priori" control df car
go which invariably ensures that all national cargoes go
on their own vessels^ and vessels of their trading part
ners, Almost all these Francophone countries have bi-la
teral trade agreements with France and some other

c o u b -*?

■

tries, under which their trade are conducted on their
National fleet. If these countries manage, through their
Shippers Councils to commandeer all government and import—
licence—covered goods as is happening in Ivory Coast, Ca
meroon and Gabon, then there will be no cargo left for
third flag vessels. COWAC does

not have the Eargo f^oo-

ling System, and this means all the numerous third flag
lines in the Conference will have to either fight for the
few "leftovers" which will be available or find business
elsewhere. If this happens, the Conference will disintegra
te, As indicated in 'an earlier Chapter all

these Franco

phone countries have vessels just enough to carry their
national trade, so one cannot hope to get any surplus as
is the case in Nigeria,
Although most of the European members of COWAC have,criti
cised the setting up of Freight Booking Bureaux by some
West African countries, these

West African countries are

determined to see to it that these Freight Bureaux work
in their favour. They have set up their- hational fleet
and they must find cargo for them. There are complaints
that some countries like Ivory Coast and Cameroons Ship—
pers Councils who administer the cargo allocation

gg

even go beyond consolidating their 40^ of their share of
the trade. They have also instituted sanctions for not
shipping on national fleet. One of these sanctions is the
forefeiture of import licence allocation the following
year. These sanctions will force all nationals to use na
tional vessels, thus killing operations of other member
lines of the Conference who hitherto^ competed on equal
terms with the national lines where they existed, or domi
nated the trade where the country did not have a national
fleet,
•c

6.2 FUTURE LINE OF ACTION BY liJEST AFRICAN NATIONAL LINES
IN. CONFERENCES,
Article 3 of B.russels Package states that
” Where a Liner Conference operates a pool of
a berthing, sailing and/or any form of cargo
allocation agreement in accordance with Arti
cle 2 of the Code of Conduct, the volume of
cargo to which the group of national shipping
lines of each Member State participating in
thetrade or the Shipping Lines of the Member
States participating in that trade'as a third
country shipping lines are entitled under the
Code shall be redistributed.......... The re
distribution of cargo ^shares shall be carried
out on the basis of a unanimous decision by
those shipping lines which are members of the
Conference and participate in the redistribu-
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tion with a v/iew to all those lines carrying
a fair share of the Conference trade,*'
ff look at both UKWAL and COWAC membership shows that the
African Lines'counterparts are covered by this Article, as
they are all coming from the E,E,C, (in COWAC a few are
from the Eastern Bloc countries). This is further demon
strated in the UKWAL's lattest cargo sharing calculations
in which the U,K, lines were allocated 53% which were to
be re-allocated between the three lines, (see pages 86-88),
I am of the strong opinion that it will be beneficial to
the West African Members of the Conference if they also
came together, forced for a recognition as one group and
then after securing the share of the group, redistributed
their shares. This can. be done by the application of com
mercial principles, taking into account, in particular, of;
a) The volume of cargo generated by each Line's country's
cargo contribution in the pool,
b) Past performance of the shipping lines in the Conference
trade.
c) The needs of the Shippers whose cargoes are being car
ried by the Conference,
i

Out of the IB countries in West African, covered by UKWAL,
Nigeria and Ghana's contribution into the pool currently
amounts to about 88^, Since their national lines are the
only two members from the Sub-region, it will be fair,
judging from their contribution, for the Conference to re
cognise them as one group for the purpose of allocation
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of shares. In this case the U,K, lines will take 50% (in
the absence of any cross -trader in the pool) and the West
Africa group also take 50%, This is, the trade is shared
equally between Britain Lines and West African lines.
If Article 3 of the Brussels Package allows for re-distri
bution of shares among the U,K, Lines so does the Code's
Article 2, paragrah 8 also allows for shares re-distribution for the West Africa lines. Here it is stated that;
, ” The National Shipping lines of a region, members
of a Conference at one end of the trade cov&red
by the Conference, may re-distribute among them
selves by mutual agreement the shares in the
trades allocated to them............ ”
Perhaps this can be done more effectively through the Mi
nisterial Conference of Central and

West

African States.

They have the negotiation machinery to get the Conferences
European members to table for negotiations.
Looking at Table 5,2 dealing with the method used in arri
ving at the current pool shares in UKWAL, if the above was
considered as the basis for the shares, the African lines,
i.e,, B.S.L, and N,N,S,L. would have been better off. This
is seen in Table 6,3 which shows what the situation would
be if Africa lines are considered as a group. All the U.K,
lines, as a group would have got 50%

and BSL/NNSL as a

group also getting 50%, 'If the 50% is split between S.,S,L,
and N^ra.,5,L, basing the sharing on their countries contri
bution in the pool N,N,S,L, gets 45% and B,S,L, 5% instead

TABLE 6 . 3

: SUGGESTED |YIETH0D TO BE USED IN DETERiTIMING UKliiAL SHARES.

(50/50 BETUiEEIM BRITISH GROUP AND AFRICAN GROUP). (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES).
SOUTHBOUND ONLY

!
,
’50/50

(2)
BALANCE

----------- r

COMBINED NORTHBOUND/SDUTH
BOUND.
(3) ; (4)
(6)
TOTAL
50/50
BALANCE
TOTAL

..

BRITISH

•

50

-

.

50

J

50

—

50

^ AVERAGE
j
^ (3),(6)
‘

j

!

50

!

J

f

GHANA

■

NIGERIA

I

j

3

0.5

41
94

5.5
6.0

f
B
! 100

3.5
46.5 1
100

!
I
r

5

1.5

6.5

■

5

35

8.5
10.0

43.5
100.0

t
I

45
100

90
10
100

!
!

ASSUMPTIONS ;
1, In the absence of any cross-trader trade is shared 50/50 between British Lines and
West African l,ines (based on the Code's equqlity principle),
2 • B,S,L, and N.,N,S,L, shares determined using their countries contribution in pool (6%
B2%

1
J

respectively for Southbound; and 10^, 70^ for combined Northbound/Southbound),
k

1

0

of their

103

allocated 42,71% and 4.2% respectively. This

shows that N,N,S,L, are currently losing muchy as a conse—
ouence of the method used in arriving at the current shares.
If this suggested method is used, in future if there is
any new line from U,K,, the line simple partakes in the 50%
allocated to Britain lines, and likewise if any African
national line decides to enter the trade, her share would
come from the 50% allocated to the African lines.

6.3 COST CONSEQUENCES OF CARGO RESERl/ATION. '
The term cargo reservation and flag discrimination are
near synonyms for the various forms of flag protection
practised by a growing number of countries. People who are
against these practices say that they constitute non—ta
riff barriers which impede world trade, raise the cost of
ocean transport and engender inefficiency.
This assertion is proved by Dr G.H, Bast and W.N, Kieft in
3 case study published in the book '*The future of Liner
Shipping".(see reference). In this case study which

is

based on actual trade figures, a comparison is marJe bet
ween two distinct shipping practices in respert of liner
services between two trading areas; one on the basis of a
a co-operative agreement between, the carriers ( a Confe
rence) , the other on basis of the application of cargo re
servation laws ( bi-lateral agreement ),

The underlying

•philosophy behind this case study is that in a line econo
mic viability can be attained, respectively improved by
optimal routeing, rationalisation and intelligent co-ope
ration, This will not benefit only the carriers, be they
state-owned or private liner companies but in a much wider
scope also the communities they serve.
To summarise this study, it was seen that under bi-lateral
arrangements vessels sailed from several countries in. one
region (say. West Africa) destined for the same overseas
ports. It was revealed.that it is foolish to operate liner
services between two trading areas in this manner. Not on
ly would the operation be uneconomical, causing freight
rates to be higher than necessary, the greater number of
ships required would cause port congestion or aggravate it,
where it already exist. This would slow down the turnround of the ships and thus lower their effective carrying
capacity. Secondly this concept has the effect of depriving
all the participants of the opportunity to improve their
economies of scale. By spliting up their transport markets
in separate enclaves, they condemn themselves to the use of
slower and less efficient tonnage (it must be noted here that
this bi-lateral concept is likened to the UNCTAD AO-40-20
leaving out the 20%, The AO-AO which is the bulk is just
like a bi-lateral arrangement).
The cost consequence of bi-lateralism as against normal li
ner services is summarised in Table 6,2, The -.study revea—
l.ed that a side effect of the bi-lateral operation, which

4
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cannot be quantified financially, is that the 28 ships ma
ke 857 port calls per annum whereas the joint service ves
sel make 400 calls per year for the same amount of cargo.
The "bunching" of the ships in the ports on both sides of
the ocean, is bound to increase cost (congestion of ports
and terminals, delays to vessels etc.). From Table 6,2 we'
see that the overall cost under the bi-lateral concept
exceeds that of Joint Service by 44,8% which is a collosal
figure. The concluding portion of the study showed that
the total cost consequence of the bi-lateral versus the
multi—carrier concept % 13,194,895 more, and consequently,
by calculation, the freight revenue require on increase of
% 16,53 per ton.
Bringing this study closer home, it is some how proved
right. If one takes for instance the cargo reservation,
practices going on in. West Africa, it would be seen that
the ultimate result will be increase in freight rate due
to high operational cost of the national lines of the subregion which stems from in efficiency, irrational sailings
and uneconomical operations: Most of these countries under
the Code reserve almost all their national cargo to their
national fleet, which in. most cases are inefficient. Their
breakeven points are so high due to high operational cost,
and in the long run will lead to increase in freight rates.
Perhaps the national importers and exporters will be pa
ying more to their national carriers than they would have
paid if normal liner services were being conducted in the

SUIvinARY OF COST CONSEQUENCES

A
BILATERAL CONCEPT

COST ITEMS

$

B
JOINT SERVICE

A EXCEEDS B BY

$

%

Capital Cost
Repairs & Maintenance
Insurance
20^ of Investment

18,460,800

7,968,800

43.2

Port Expenses

1,117,664

830,768

■ 286,896

34.5

Crew Cost

8,831,000

5,692,000

3,139,000

55.1

Bunkers

6,261,200

4,461,000

1,800,200

42,639,464

29,444,568

13,194,895

TOTAL

1, 28 ships serve Bilateral arrangement
2, 8 ships are used in the joint service *
3, The same amount of cargo carried by A & B,

•

a

26,429,600

44.8
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region.

I am of the opinion that the basic pattern, of transport e conomy is no way different from that of other economic
activities, that is, it must provide the best possible
cost whilst procuring an. acceptable return on investment.
In accordance with customary economic appraisement, opti
mal quality of service in liner shipping inevitably en
tails also speed and frequency whilst the yield is highly
sensitive to the degree of useful occupancy of the produc
tion units engaged in the process. If these conditions are
met; sound operation of services is assured; if these are
brushed aside liner shipping will be doomed to flounder in
an endless bog of frustation. It is however my fervent hope
that national lines of West Africa prove this case study
wrong by giving their various countries and Shippers the
optimum economic service in order not to cause freight ra
tes to increase.

6,3 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CODE,
The Code of Conduct came

into force on. the 6th October

1983, after the required number of States had ratified it,
Most countries hope to benefit from this new order, so the
question of its possible economic effects becomes one to
which our attention should be turned.
As indicated by S,G, ^Sturmey during the International Sym
posium held at Bremen (see references) the type of econo
mic effects which could be produced by the Code may be
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categorised as two. First is the possible effect on.the
level of world income as a whole and the second is the
effect on. the distribution of income. However, it is high
ly unlikely that the effect on the global effects of the
Code will be largely non-economic, for example, the
strengthening of the weak against the strong to secure a
more equitable bargaining situation. Professor Sturmey
thinks the transfer effect will be much more important,
and economically, it is from there the major economic
changes will occur. Although the measureable effects of
(■

the Code of Conduct on world incomes are likely to be
small, they will be favourable. They will arise from
change in the location of economic activity, and this
will be the main factor. But there should be other over
all gains from improvements in efficiency and a lessening
of monopoly powers arising from the process of consulta
tion.
It seems that developing countries have a strong compara
tive advantage in conventional shipping, Uie have heard
for sometime now that liner shipping is unprofitable in
the rich countries, and that a shift in the world divi- '
sion of economic function under which some of this was mo
ved to poor countries should be a favourable move, leadin
the world nearer to an optimum allocation of resources
rather than a move leading to a position further from the
optimum. Some shipping economists feel that if there was
a choice, liner shipping would practically have died out

1p9
o

in developed countries and would now be a virtual monopoly
of developing countries since it is the most labour using
area of shipping. However one should not think that because
developing countries may today have a comparative advantage
over developed countries in conventional liner shipping
they are going to remain tied to an out-dated technology
while the traditional maritime nations retain their present
position of strength by adopting the most modern technolo
gies. I^’must be borne in mind that shipping is an interna
tional industry. There are parts of ocean borne trade which,
for the foreseable future, will more economically b'a carried
by fairly conventional vessels. In a system operating under
the principles of classical economic^^these would be operated
and owned in developing countries. We

may now

turn

our

attention to the question of income transfers. In most deve
loped countries they believe that their shipping industries
will suffer economic loss, as a result of the Code, Some
even mention a loss of ^ 1000 million per annum. What is not
clear is whether this is being canvassed as a straight for
ward economic loss or whether it is a transfer from some Eu
ropean countries to those developing and other countries
which stand the Code, The income transfers which are likely
to occur as a result of the Code have several facets. Ob
viously the increases in income which would occur also imply
a transfer; indeed the most important could not occur without'
a transfer. Other transfers are likely to be neutral as far
as income level is concerned.

They will occur in a number of ways, for example, through
the moderating effect of the Code on freight rate increa
ses, the assistance to developing countries exports by
promotional freight rates. Not all transfers will be from
rich countries to poor countries and some will occur
within, these groups. However the major transfer will be
from rich to poor, to the generators of a.large part of
world trade but the carrier of a share which is signifi
cantly smaller, to those who ultimately bear the force of
most freight rate increases but have little or no

say in
««
their determination, to those who could economically build

up their economies by expanding their liner fleets but
have to go cap in hand and beg to be allowed to carry their
own trade. This sort of transfer is what economic develop
ment is all about.
So far as the Code is concerned, any income transfer, so
far as the loss by the rich countries is concerned, will
almost certainly be a slowing down in the rate of increase
of income rather than a reduction. There is no*evidence at
all to suggest that the long term growth of .Morld trade is
going to be reversed, despite present tendencies* and there
fore there is plenty of scope for individual.shipping lines
in developed countries which might find themselves losing
trade as a result of the cargo allocation rules of the Code
to move into other types of shipping. It is observed that
changes are not going to occur overnight since most develo
ping countries have neither the fleets to take up their

I l l

s h a r e s i m m e d i a t e l y no r t h e cash t o

expand t h o s e f l e e t s

ra

p id ly .

In conclusion, it can be said that the world as a whole
will economically gain from the Code; some poor countries
will gain something at the expense of the rich. But basi
cally the Code is not about income transfer. The Code is
about justice and redressing of the balance of disadvan
tage, It is about the creation, of a new deal and better
order.
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Signatures and ratification of, or accessions to, the Convention on
o f Conduct for Liner Conferences.
The countries, arranged in chrnnologic<il order of signing, arc:
Ghana
Chile
Pakistan
Ciamhia
Sri Lanka
Vcncnicla
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Benin
United Republic of Tanzania
Niger
Philippines
Guatemala
Mexico
United Republic of Cameroon
Cuba
Indonesia
Ivory Coast
Central African Republic
Senegal
Zaire
Madagascar
Togo
Cape Verde
India
Kcnva
M ali
Sudan
Gabon
P.thiopia
irai)
Costa Rica
Peru
ngypt
Tunisia
Republic of Korea
Czechoslovakia
Hondur.as
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
German Democratic Republic
Sierra Leone
Uruguay
Bulgaria
Guyana
Morocco
Jordan
Yugoslavia
Guinea
Mauritius
China
Barbados
Romania
Lebanon
Jamaica
Congo
Malaysia
Federal Republic of Germany!
Netherlands!
Trinidad and Tobago

24 June l')7.S
2.S June l'J75
27 June I')75
30 June 1975
.30 June 1975
30 June 1975
24 Julv 1975
10 September 1975
27 October 1975
3 November 1975
13 January 1976
2 March 1976
3 March 1976
6 M ay 1976
15 June 1976
23 June 1976
I I .lanuarv 1977
17 February 1977
13 M ay 1977
20 M ay 1977
20 July 1977
23 December 1977
12 January I97R
13 January 1978
14 February 1978
27 Fchruarv 1978
15 March 1978
16 March 1978
5 June 1978
f September 1978
25 October 1978
27 October 197821 November 1978
25 January 1979
15 March 1979
I I M av 1979
2 June 1979
4 June 1979
28 June 1979
9 Julv 1979
9 Julv 1979
9 Julv 1979
12 July 1979
7 Fchruarv 1980
I I Fchruarv 1980
11 March 1980
7 Julv 1980
19 August 1980
16 September 1980
23 September 1980'
29 October 1980
7 Jamiarv 1982
30 April 1982
20 Julv 1982
26 Julv 1982
27 August 1982
6 April 1983
6 April 1983
3 August 1983
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APPENDIX 2',

1 1 4 ,.

1 * The Brussels Package
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No, 954/79 o fl5 May 1979 concerning th e raiilication by Member Stales of. or

their accession to, the United Nations Convenlion on a Code of Conduct of kiner Cunrcrences.
THE COUNCIL OK THE EUROfEAN COMMUNIl IIS
(

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 84
(2) thereof, having regard to the draft Regulation submitted by the Commission, having regard to the opinion
of the European Parliameni, having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee.
Whereas a Convenlion on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences has been drawn up by a Conference
convened under the auspices of the United Naliuiis Conference on Trade and Development and is open for
raiilication or accession;
Whereas the questions covered by the C ik Ic of Conduct are of importance not only to the Member Stales but
also to the Community, in particular from the shipping and trading viewpoints, and it is therefore imporiani
that a common position sliould be adopted in relation to this Code;
„
Whereas this common position should respect the principles and objectives of the Treaty and make a major
contribution to meeting the aspirations of developing countries in the held of shipping while at the same lime
pursuing the objective of the coniiiiuing applicaijun in this held of the commercial principles applied by
shipping lines of the oi.u> countries;
Whereas to secure observance of these principles and objectives, since the Code of Conduct contains no
provision allowing the accession of the Community as such, it is important that Member Stales ratify or
accede to the arrangeincnis provided for in this Regulation;
Whereas the stabilising rolc'of conferences in ensuring reliable services to shippers is recognised, but it is
nevertheless necessary to avoid possible breaches by conferences of the rules of cumpetitiun laid down in the
Treaty; whereas the Commission will accordingly forward to the Council a proposal for a Regulation
concerning the application of those rules to .sea transport.
HAS ADOFTEO THtS REOULATtUN

A riiflu I
1. When ratifying the United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, or when
acceding thereto. Member States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations in writing that
such ratification or accession has taken place in accordance with this Regulation.
2.

The instrument of ratification or accession shall be accompanied by the reservations set out in Annex 1.

A rticle 2
1. In the case of an existing conference, each group of shipping lines of the same nationality which are
members thereof shall determine by commercial negotiations with another shipping line of that nationality
whether the latter may participate as a national shipping line in the said conference.
If a new conference is created, the shipping lines of the same nationality shall determine by commercial
negotiations which of them may participate as a national shipping line in the future conference.
2. Where the negotiations referred to in paragraph I fail to result in agreement, each Member State may, at
the request of one of the lines cona'rned iind after hearing all of them, take the necessary steps to settle the
dispute.
i. Each Member State shall ensure that all vessel-operating shipping lines established on its territory under
the Treaty establishing the European Econumic Community are treated in the same way as liners which have
their management head oHice on its territory and the elFcclive control of which is exercised there.
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The Brussels Package
Article .1
agrecmeni in accordant whhAMicle 2 o H lI ° C o * of
allocation
national shipping lines of each Member State p a ^ W p a t in g S ^
<o which the group of
States participating in that trade as third-cotintry^shinnin. i;
^
redistributed, unless a decision is taken to the co^
are entitled under the Code shall be
and panics to the present redistribution rules. The rcdKirihnfinn
" ''^ ^***^ njcmjxrrs of the Conference
basis ofa unanimous decision bv lho.se shipping lines which nrc m cm ^r« nf i
^ carried out on the
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lines in the trade covered by the pool-

(r/1 the needs of the K " ' w h o s e l V r g o [ r a r e ca^

States;

II. Any dispute not settled by thc conciliaiion procedure ma v u-ri, fh
arbitration. In that event, the award of the
be

procedure set out in Annex

InrW reJiei^d“',lJrg"im ^^

parapaphs 1.2 and 3 shall

viewpoint of providing adequate and enicieni services to shippers^’

^

'I":

Article 4
of Conduct and n o ra J 'o E C D c o u n tT ,^ shl^^

line''<irinothc; M ^ m S r Sm

c o n f^ ;re T r^ £ °n ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^
countries which are parties I o X o i d l

^

V'h

’" ’1 '»>' o th ir oecd

shipping lines o fa deveS"n7counrrv which l e ?
T
' ^
^
of Conduct, of the
which are:
^
«=n?niscd as national shipping lines under the Code and
(a) already members of a conference serving these trades: or
I admitted to such a conference under Article I (3) of the Code.

..n iy i.,
relationships or, on a reciprocal basis in r e i'iiir.n i...i.’
other procedures for settling disnutcs hate t^e
^

°

r . “
'
'o Chapter V I of the Code in their mutual
countries where

advantage of the p o s s i b i I i t i e s " p ? S b y r r t S e 2 5 7 S
7 ''" 7 ! '
procedures other than those laid down in S p ” v V S S ^ ' d e ^ ^

fol'

Article S

Article 6

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member Stales.
Done at Brussels, 15 M a y 1979
F ar the Council
The President
R. Baulin
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ANNliX I
KHStKVATIONS

When rulifying the Convention or when ucceJing thereto, Member States shall enter the following three
reservations and interpretative reservation:
1. For the purposes of the Code of Conduct, the term 'national shipping line* may, in the case of a Member
Slate of the Community, include any vessel-operating shipping line established on the territory of such
Member Slate in accordance with the la.c Treaty.
2. (u) Without prejudice to paragraph (h) of this reservation, Article 2 of the Code of Conduct shall not be
applied in conference trades between the Member Slates of the Community or, on a reciprocal basis, between
such Slates and other oucu countries which are parties to the Code.
(b)
Point (u) shall not alTcci the opportunities for participation as third country shipping lines in such
trades, in accordance with the principles rellected in Article 2 of the Code, of the shipping lines of a developing
country which are recognised as national shipping lines under the Code and which arc:
(i) already members of a conference serving these trades;
(ii) admitted to such a conference under Article I (3) of the Code.
3. Articles 3 and 14 (9) of the Code of Conduct shall not be applied in conference trades between the
Member Stales of the Community or, on a reciprocal basis, between such Slates and the other o e c u countries
which are parlies to the Code.
4.

!n trades to which Article 3 of the Code of Conduct applies, the last sentence of that Article is interpreted

as meaning that:
(uj the two groups of national shipping lines will coordinate their positions before voting on matters
concerning the trade between their two countries;
(h) this sentence applies sole!) to matters which the conference agreement identifies as requiring the
assent oT both groups of national shipping lines concerned, and not to all matters covered by the
conference agreement.
ANNEX It
CONCILIATION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 (3j

The parlies to the dispute shall designate one or more conciliators.
Should they fail to agree on the mutter, each of the parties to the dispute shall designate a conciliator and the
conciliators thus designated shall co-opt another conciliator to act us chairman. Should a party fail to
designate a conciliator or the conciliators designated by the parlies fail to reach agreement on the chairman,
the President of the International Chamber of Commerce shall, at the request of one of the parlies, make the
necessary designations.
The conciliators shall make every endeavour to settle the dispute. They shall decide on the procedure to be
followed, Their fees shall be paid by the parties to the dispute.
NON-EEC MEMBERS OF OECD

Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Stales.

.«
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Annex 1
CONVENTION ON A CODE OF CONDUCl' FOK LIN ER CONFERENCES

OBJECTIVES A N D PRINCIPLES

National shipping line

Agreeing to reflect in tlie Code tlie following fundamen
tal objectives and basic principles;

A national shipping line o f any given country is a
vessel-operating carrier which has its head office o f manage
ment and its effective control in that country and is
recognized as such by an appropriate authority o f that
country or under the law o f that country.
Lines belonging to and operated by a jo in t venture
involving two or more countries and in whose equity tlie
national interests, public and/or private, o f those countries
have a substantial shaie and whose head office o f management and whose effective control is in one o f those
countries can be recognized as a national line by the
appropriate authorities o f lliose countries.

(a j The objective to facilitate the orderly expansion o f
world sea-borne trade;

Third-country shipping line

The Contracting Parties to the present Convention,
Desiring to improve the liner conference system,
' Recognizing the need for a universally acceptable code o f
conduct for liner conferences,
'Taking into account the special needs and problems ol
the developing countries with respect to the activities o f
liner conferences serving their foreign trade.

(b ) The objective to stimulate the development o f
regular and efflcient liner services adequate to the require
ments o f the trade concerned;

A vessel-opeiating caiiier in its operations between two
countiies o f which it is not a national shipping line.

(c) The objective to ensure a balance o f interests
between suppliers and users o f liner sliipping services;

Shipper

(d ) The principle that conference practices should not
involve any discrimination against the shipowners, shippers
or the foreign trade o f any country;
(e) The principle that conferences hold meaningful
consultations with shippers’ organizations, shippers rej)resentatives and shippers on matters o f common interest,
w ith, upon request, the participation o f appropriate auth
orities;
( f) The principle that conferences should make available
to interested parties pertinent information about tlieir
activities which are relevant to those parties and sliould
publish meaningful information on their activities.

A person or entity who has entered into, or who
demonstrates an intention to enter into, a contractual or
other aiiangement with a conference or shipping line for
the shipment o f gvioits in which he has a beneficial interest.
Sh ippers' organization
An association oi equivalent body which promotes,
re[)ieseuts and piotects the inteicsts of shippers and, i f
those uuthoiities so desire, is recognized in that capacity by
the appropriate authority or authorities o f the country
whose shijipeis it represents.
Goods carried by the conference
Cargo transported by shipping lines members o f a
conference in accordance w ith the conference agreement.

Have agreed as follows;

Appropriate authority
Part one
Chapter I
DEFINITIONS

Either a government or a body designated by a govern
ment or by national legislation to perform any o f the
functions ascribed to such authority by the provisions o f
this Code.

L in e r conference o r conference

Promotional freight rate *

A group o f two or more vessel-operating carriers which
provides international liner services for the carriage o f cargo
on a particular route or routes w ithin specified geographical
lim its and which has an agreement or arrangement, what
ever its nature, w ithin the framework o f which they operate
under uniform or common freight rates and any other
agreed conditions w ith respect to the provision ol liner
services.

A rate instituted for promoting the ctirriage o f nontraditional exports o f the country concerned.
Special freight rate
A preferential freight rate, other than a prom otioiial
freiglit rale, which may be negotiated between the parties
concerned.

•
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ampler I I
RELATISNS AMONG MEMBER LINES
A rticle I
MEMBERSHIP
1. Any national slipping line slnill have the right to be a
fu ll member o f a conference wliich serves the foreign trade
o f its country, subject to the criteria set out in article 1,
paragraph 2. Shipping lines which are not national lines in
any trade o f a conference shall have the right to become
fu ll members o f that conference, subject to the criteria set
out in article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, and to the provisions
'V regarding the share o f trade as set out in article 2 as regards
third-country shipping lines.
2. A shipping line applying fo r membership o f a confer
ence shall furnisli'evidence o f its ability and intention,
which may include the use o f chartered tonnage, provided
the criteria o f this paragraph are met, to operate a regular,
adequate and efficient service on a long-term basis as defined
in the conference agreentent w itliin the framework o f the
conference, shall undertake to abide by all the terms and
conditions o f the conference jigrecment, and shall deposit a
financial guarantee to cover any outstanding financial
obligation in the event o f subsequent withdrawal, sus
pension or expulsion from membership, i f so required
under the conference agreement.
3. In considering an application for mcmbersliip by a
shipping line which is not a national line in any trade o f the
conference concerned, in addition to the provisions o f
article I , paragraph 2, the following criteria, inter alia,
sliould be taken into account:
(a) The existing volume o f the trade on the route or
routes served by the conference and prospects fo r its
growth;
(b) The adequacy o f shipping space for the existing and
prospective volume o f trade on the route or routes served
by the conference;
(c) The probable eflect o f admission o f the shipping line
to the conference on the efficiency and quality o f the
conference service;
(d) The current participation o f the shipping line in
trade on the same route or routes outside the framework o f
a conference; and
(e) The current participation o f the shipping line on tlie
same route or routes w ithin the framework o f another
conference.
The above criteria shall not be applied so as to subvert
the implementation o f the provisions relating to participa
tion in trade set out in article 2.
4. An application for admission or readmission to
membership shall be promptly decided upon and the
decision communicated by a conference to an applicant
prom ptly, and in no case later than six months from the
date o f application. When a shipping line is refused

admission or readmission tlie conference shall,, at the same
time, give in w riting the grounds for such refusal.
5. When considering applications for admission, a con
ference shall lake into account the views put forward by
shijipers and shippers’ organizations o f the countries whose
trade is carried by the conference, as well as the views o f
appropriate authorities i f they so request.
6. In addition to the criteria for admission set out in
article 1, paragraph 2, a shipping line applying for re
admission shall also give evidence o f having fulfilled its
obligations in accordatice w ith article 4, paragraphs 1 and 4.
The conference may give special scrutiny to the circum
stances under which the line left the conference.

A rticle 2
P A K T lC im iO N IN TRADE
1. Any shipping line admitted to membership o f a
conference shall have sailing and loading rights in the trades
covered by that conference.
2. When a conference operates a po'61, all shipping lines
ntembers o f the cotileience serving the trade covered by the
pool sliall have the right to participate in the pool for that
trade.
3. For the purpose o f determining the share o f trade
which member lines shall have the right to acquire, the
natiorral sltippittg lirres o f each country, irrespective o f the
number o f lirres, shall be regarded as a single group o f
shipping litres for that country.
4. Wlretr determining a share o f trade w ithin a pool o f
irtdividual merrrber lines and/or groups o f rrational shipping
lirres irr accordarrce wrilr article 2, paragraplr 2, the
follow iiig prirrciples regardirtg their right to jrarticipatioir in
the trade carried by the conference shall be observed, unless
otherwise mutually ugieed;
(a) lire group o f rratiirrral shippirrg litres o f each o f two
couirtries the foreign lt.tde between which is carried by the
cottlcretrcc sltirll have equal rights to participate in the
freight atrd vohtrne o f iia ffic generated by tlreir mutual
foreign trade arrd carried by the confereirce;
(b ) 'I'hird-country shipping lines, i f any, shall have the
right to aaptite a sigirilicant part, such as 20 per cent, in
the freight arrd volume o f tralfic generated by that trade.
5. II, for any orte o f the countries whose trade is carried
by a corrieierrce, theie are no national shipping lines
particrjrating irr the cutii.ige o f that trade, the share o f the
trade to which natiurrul shipping lines o f that country
would be errtitled irrrder article 2, paragraph 4 shall be
distributed among the individual member lines participating
in the trade in projiortion to Uieir respective share.
6. I f the national shipping lines o f one country decide
not to carry their fu ll sliare o f the trade, tJiat portion o f
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Uieir share o f the trade which they do not carry shall be
distributed among the individual member lines participating
in the trade in proportion to their respective shares.
7. I f the national shipping lines o f the countries con
cerned do not participate in the trade between those
countries covered by a conference, the sltares o f trade
carried by the conference between those countries sliall be
allocated between the participating member lines o f th iid
countries by commercial negotiations between those lines.
8. The national shipping lines o f a region, members o f a
conference, at one end o f the trade covered by the
conference, may redistribute among themselves by mutual
agreement the sltares in trades allocated to them, in
accordance w ith article 2, paragraphs 4 to 7 inclusive.
9. Subject to the provisions o f article 2, paragraphs 4 to
8 inclusive regarding shares o f trade among individual
shipping lines or groups o f shipping lines, pooling or
trade-sharing agreements shall be reviewed by the confer
ence periodically, at intervals to be stipulated in those
agreements and in accordance w ith criteria to be specified
in the conference agreement.
10. The application o f the present article shall com
mence as soon as possible after entry into force o f the
present Convention and shall be completed w ithin a
transition period which in no case shall be longer than two
years, taking into account the specific situation in each o f
the trades concerned.
11. Shipping lines members o f a conference shall be
entitled to operate chartered ships to fu lfil their conference
obligations.
12. The criteria for sharing and the revision o f shares as
set out in article 2, paragraphs 1 to 11 inclusive shall apply
when, in the absence o f a pool, there exists berthing, sailing
and/or any other form o f cargo allocation agreement.
13. Where no pooling, berthing, sailing or other trade
participation agreements exist in a conference, either group
o f national shipping lines, members o f the conference, may
require that pooling arrangements be introduced, in respect
o f the trade between their countries carried by tite
conference, in conform ity w ith the provisions o f article 2,
paragraph 4; or alternatively they may require that the
sailings be so adjusted as to provide an opportunity to these
lines to enjoy substantially the same rights to participate in
.the trade between tliose two countries carried by th e /
conference a? they would have enjoyed under the pro
visions o f arjicle 2, paragraph 4. Any such request shall be
considered and decided by the conference. I f there is no
agreement to institute such a pool or adjustment o f sailings
among the members o f the conference, the groups o f
national shipping lines o f the countries at both ends o f the
trade shall have a niajority vote in deciding to establislr such
a pool or adjustment o f sailings. The matter shall be

decided upon w ithin a period not exceeding six months
from the receipt o f the request.
14. In the event o f a disagreemetU between the national
shipping lines o f the countries at either end whose trade is
served by tlie conference w ith regard to whether or not
pooling shall be introduced, they may require that w ithin
the conference sailings be so adjusted as to provide an
opportunity to these lines to enjoy substantially the same
rights to participate in the trade between those two
countries carried by the conference as they would have
enjoyed under the provisions o f article 2, paragraph 4. In
the event that there are no national shipping lines in one o f
the countries whose trade is served by the conference, the
national sliipping line or lines o f the other country may
make the same reque.sl. The conference shall use its best
endeavours to meet this request. If, however, this request is
not met, the aijproptiale authorities o f the countries at
both ends o f the trade may take up the matter i f they so
wish and make their views known to the parties concerned
for their consideration. I f no agreement is reached, the
dispute sliall be dealt w ith in accordance w ith the pro
cedures established in this Code.
15. Other shipping lines, members o f a conference, may
also request that pooling or sailing agreements be intro 
duced, and the request shall be considered by the confer
ence in accordance with the relevant provisions o f tltis
Code.
16. A conference shall provide for appropriate measures
in any conlerence pooling agreement to cover cases where
the cargo has been shut out by a member line for any
reason excepting late presentation by the sliipper. Such
agreement sliall provide that a vessel with unbooked space,
capable o f being used, be allowed to lift the cargo, even in
excess o f the pool shaie o f the line in the trade, i f otherwise
the cargo would be shut out and delayed beyond a period
set by the conference.
17. The provisioirs-of article 2, paragraphs 1 to 16
inclusive concern all goods regardless o f their origin, their
destination oi the use fur which they are intended, w ith the
exception o f m ilitary equipment for national defence
pur|ioses.

A rticle 3
DliClSlO N-M AKlNG PROCEDURES
_
r
The decision-making procedures embodied in a confer
ence agreement shall lie based on the equality o f all the full
member lines; these procedures shall ensure that, the voting
rules do not hinder the proper work o f the conference and
the service o f the tiade and shall define the matters on
wh’ich decisions w ill be made by unanimity. However, a
decision cannot be taken in respect ol matters defined in a
conlerence agreement relating to the trade between tw o
countries without the consent o f the national sliipping hnes
o f those two countries.

I
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A rticle 4
d

SANCTIONS

1. A slapping line member o f a conference shall be
entitled, subject to the provisions regarding withdrawal
w liich are embodied in pool schemes and/or cargo-sharing
arrangements, to secure its release, w itlio ut penalty, from
the terms o f the conference agreement after giving three
months’ notice, unless the conference agreement provides
fo r a different time period, althougli it shall be required to
fu lfil its obligations as a member o f the conference up to
the date o f its releasey
2. A conference may, upon notice to be specified in the
conference agreement, suspend or expel a member for
significant failure to abide by the terms and conditions o f
the conference agreement.

2.
Shipping lines and conferences are entitled to the full
co-operation o f shippers and shippers’ organizations in the
endeavour to conibul malpractices and breaches.

A rticle 6
CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS
A ll conference agreements, pooling, berthing and sailing
rights agreements and amendments or other documents
diiectly related to, and which affect, such agreements shall
be made available on request to tlie appropriate authorities
o f the countries whose tiade is served by the conference
and o f the countries whose shipping lines are members o f
the conference.

Chail ter I I I
3. No expulsion or suspension shall become effective
u ntil a statement in writing o f the reasons therefor has
been given and until any dispute has been settled as
provided in chapter V I.

K liL A llO N S WITH SHIPPERS

4. Upon withdrawal or expulsion, the line concerned
shall be required to pay its share o f the outstanding
financial obligations o f the conference, up to the date o f its
withdrawal or expulsion. In cases o f withdrawal, suspension
or expulsion, the line shall not be relieved o f its own
financial obligations under the conterence agreement or o f
any o f its obligations towards shippers.

1. The shipping lines members of«a conference are
entitled to institute and maintain loyalty arrangements w ith
shippers, the (oim and terms o f which are matters for
Consultation between the conference and shippers’ organiz
ations or representatives o f .shippers. These loyalty arrange
ments .shall provide safeguards making exidicit the rights o f
shippeis and cont'eience members. These arrangements shall
be l)a.se-d on the contiaet system or any other system which
IS also lawful.

A rticle 7
LO YALTY ARILANGEMENTS

A rticle 5

2. Whatever loyalty airangernents are made, the freight
rate a|)plicalile to loyal shippers shall be determined w ithin
a fixed range ol peicentages o f the freight rate applicable to
1.
A conference shall adopt and keep up to date an other sliipjieis. Whcie a change in the differential causes an
illustrative list, wliich shall be as comprehensive as possible,
increase in the rales cliaiged to sliippers, the change can be
o f practices wliich are regarded as malpractices and/or
im|)lemenled only after l.‘iO days’ notice to those sliippers
breaches o f the conference agreement and shall provide
or according to regional practice and/or agreement. Dis
effective selt-policing machinery to deal w ith them, with
putes ill connexion with a change o f the diffeiential shall be
specific provisions requiring:
settled as jiiuvided in the loyalty agreement.
SELF-POLICING

• (a) The fixing o f penalties or a range o f penalties for
malpractices or breaches, to be commensuiute w ith their
seriousness;
(b j The examination and impartial review o f an adjudi
cation o f complaints, and/or decisions taken on complaints,
against malpractices or breaches, by a person or body
unconnected with any o f the shipping lines members o f the
conference or their affiliates, on request by the conference
or any other party concerned;

3. The terms ol loyally arrangements shall provide
safeguaids making explicit the rights and obligations o f
shippeis and o fsliip |inig lines members o f the conference in
accoidance with the following provisions,//i/eru/w:

(a) The shipjrer shall be bound in respect o f cargo whose
shijnnent is controlled by him or his affiliated or subsidiary
company or his foiwarding agent in accordance w ith the
conliact o f sale o f the goods concerned, jrrovided that the
shipper shall not, by evasion, subterfuge, or intermediary,
(c)
The reporting, on request, on the action taken in attempt to divert cargo in violation o f his loyalty com m it
ment;
connexion with complaints against malpractices and/or
breaches, and on a basis o f anonymity for the parties
(b) Wheie there is a loyalty contract, the extent o f
concerned, to the appropriate authorities o f the countries
actual or liquidated damages and/or penalty shall be
whose trade is served by the conference and o f the
S]>ecified in the contract. The member lines o f the
countries whose shipping lines are members o f the confer
conference may. however, decide to assess lower liquidated
ence.
damages or to waive the claim to liquidated damages. In
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any event, the liquidated damages under tlie contract to be
paid by the shipper shall not exceed the freight charges on
tiie particular shipment, computed at the rate provided
under the contract;
(c) The shipper shall be entitled to resume fu ll loyally
status, subject to the fulfilm ent o f conditions established
by the conference which shall be specified in the loyally
arrangement;
(d) The loyalty arrangement shall set out:
( i) A list o f cargo, which may include bulk cargo
shipfied w ithout mark or count, which is specifically
excluded from the scope o f the loyalty arrange
ment;
(ii) A definition o f the circumstances in which cargo
other than cargo covered by (i) above is considered
to be excluded from the scope o f the loyalty
arrangement;
(Hi) The inelhod o f settlement o f disputes arising under
the loya lly arrangement;
(iv) Provision for termination o f the loyalty arrangement
on request by either a shipper or a conference
w ithout penalty, after expiry o f a stipulated period
o f notice, such notice to be given in writing; and
. (v) The terms for granting dispensation.

shippers, shippers’ organizations and other parties concerned
at reasonable cost, and they sliall be available for examina
tion at offices o f shipping lines and their agents. They shall
spell out all conditions concerning the application o f freight
rales and the carriage o f any cargo covered by them.

A rticle 10
AN N U A L REPORTS
Conferences shall provide annually to shipper’ organiz
ations, or to representatives o f shippers, reports on their
activities designed to provide general infonnation o f
interest to them, including relevant information about
consultations held w ith shippers and shippers’ organiz
ations, action taken regarding complaints, changes in
membership, and significant changes in service, tariffs and
conditions o f cairiage. Such annual reports sliall be submit- '
ted, on request, to the appropriate authorities o f the
countries whose trade is served by the conference con
cerned.

A rticle 11 •*
CONSULTATION MACHINERY

4.
I f there is a dispute between a conference and a
sliippers’ organization, representatives o f shippers and/or
1. There shall be consultations on matters o f common
shippers about the form or terms o f a proposed loyally
interest between a conference, shippers’ organizations,
arrangement, either party may refer the matter fo r resorepresentatives o f shippers and, where practicable, shippers,
■lution under appropriate procedures as set out in tlusCode.
which may be designated for that purpose by the appro
priate a u lh o iily if it so desires. These consultations shall
take place whenevei requested by any o f the aboveA rticle 8
mentioned parlies. Appropriate authorities shall have the
DISPENSATION
right, upon lequest, to participate fu lly in the consulta
tions, but this does not mean that they play a decision
1. Conferences shall provide, w ithin the terms o f the
making lole.
loyalty arrangements, that requests by shippers for dis()cnsation shall be examined and a decision given quickly and,
2 . I'he following matters, inter alia, may be the subject
i f requested, the reasons given in writing where dispensation
o f consultation;
is witliheld. Should a conference fail to confinn, w ithin a
period specified in the loyalty arrangement, sufficient space
(a)
Changes in general ta riff conditions and related
to accommodate a shipper’s cargo w itliin a period also
regulations;
specified in the loyalty arrangement, the shipper siiall have
(h) Changes in the general level o f ta riff rates and rates
.the right, w ithout being penalized, to utilize any vessel lor
for major commodities;
the cargo in t)uestion.
2 . In ports where conference services are arranged
subject to the availability o f a specified minimum ol cargo
(i.e. on inducement), but either the shipjnng line does not
call, despite due notice by shippers, or the shipping line
does not reply w ithin an agreed time to the notice given by
shippers, shippers shall automatically have the right, w ith 
out prejudicing their loyalty status, to use any available
vessel for the carriage o f their cargo.
A rticle 9
A V A IL A B IL IT Y OF TARIFFS AND RELATED
CONDITIONS AND/OR REGULATIONS
Tariffs, related conditions, regulations, and any amend
ments tliereto sliall be made available on request to

(c j Promotional and/or special Ireight rates;
(d) Imposition of, and related changes in, surcharges;
(e} Loyalty airangements, their establishment or changes
in their form and general conditions;
(J'J Changes in the ta riff classification o f ports; ■

(g)
Procedure lo i the supply o f necessary information
by shijipeis conccinlng the expected volume and nature o f
then caigoes; and
(li) Presentation o f cargo for shipment and the require
ments regarding notice o f cargo availability.

3.
To the extent that they fall w ithin the scope o
activity o f a confcience, the following matters may also be
the subject ol consultation;
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(a) Operation o f cargo inspection services;
(b j Changes in Uje pattern o f services;
(c) Effects o f the introduction o f new technology in the
carriage o f cargo, in particular unitization, with consequent
reduction o f conventional service or loss o f direct services;
and
(d) Adequacy and quality o f sliipping services, including
the impact o f pooling, berthing or sailing arrangements on
the availability o f shipping services and freight rates at
which shipping services are provided; changes in the areas
served and in the regularity o f calls by conference vessels.
4. Consultations shall be held before final decisions are
taken, unless otherwise provided in this Code. Advance
notice shall be given o f the intention to take decisions on
matters referred to in article 11, paragraphs 2 and 3. Where
tliis is impossible, urgent decisions may be taken pending
the holding o f consultations.
5. Consultations sliall begin without undue delay and in
any event within a maximum period specified in tlie
conference agreement or, in the absence o f such a provision
in the agreement, not later than 30 days after receipt o f the
proposal for consultations, unless different periods o f time
are provided in this Code.
6. When holding consultations, the parties .shall use their
best efforts to provide relevant information, to hold timely
discussions and to clarify matters for the purpose o f seeking
solutions o f the issues concerned. The parties involved shall
take account o f each other’s views and problems :uid strive
to reach agreement consistent w ith their commercial
viability.

Chapter JV
FREIGHT RATES
A rticle 12
C RITERIA FOR FREIGHT-RATE DETERMINATION
In arriving at a decision on questions o f ta riff policy in
all cases mentioned in this Code, the following promts shall,
unless otlierwise provided, be taken into account:
(a) Freiglit rates shall be fixed at as low a level as is
feasible from the commercial point o f view and shall permit
a reasonable p ro fit for sliipowiiers;
(b) The cost o f operations o f conferences shall, as a rule,
be evaluated for the round voyage o f ships, with the
outward and inward directions considered as a single whole.
Where applicable, the outward and inward voyage should be
considered separately. The freight rales should take into
account, among other factors, the nature o f cargoes, the
interrelation between weight ^and cargo measurement, as
well as the value o f cargoes;
(c) In fixing promotional freiglit rates and/or special
freight rates for specific goods, the conditions o f trade lor
these goods o f llie countries served by the conference.

particularly o f developing and land-locked countries, shall
be taken into account.

A rticle 13
CONFERENCE TARIFFS AND CLASSIFICATION
OF TAR IFF RATES
1. Conference tariffs shall not unfairly differentiate
between shippers similarly situated. Shipping lines members
o f a conference shall adhere strictly to the rates, rules and
terms shown in the tariffs and other currently valid ,
published documents o f the conference and to any special
arrangements permitted under this Code.
2 . Conference tariffs should be drawn up simply and
clearly, containing as few classes/categories as possible,
depending on the commodity and, where appropriate, fo r
each class/calegory; they should also indicate, wherever
practicable, in order to facilitate statistical compilation and
analysis, the corresponding appropriate code number o f the
item in accordance with the Standard International Trade
Classification, the Brussels T a riff Nomenclature or any
other nomenclaluie that may be internationally adopted;
the classification o f commodities in th e ja riffs should, as far
as practicable, be prepared in co-operation w ith shippers’
organizations and other national and international organiz
ations concerned.

A rticle 14
GENERAL FREIGHT-RATE INCREASES
1. A conference shall give notice o f not less than 150
days, or according to regional practice and/or agreement, to
slnpirers’ organizations or representatives o f shippers and/or
ship|)ers and, where so required, to appropriate authorities
o f the countries whose trade is served by the conlerence, o f
its intention to effect a general increase in freight rates, an
indication o f its extent, the date o f effect and the reasons
supporting the proposed increase.
2. A t the request o f any o f the parties prescribed for this
purpose in this Code, to be made w ithin an agreed period o f
lime after the receipt o f the notice, consultations sliall
commence, in accordance w itli the relevant provisions o f
this Code, w ithin a stipulated period not exceeding 30 days
or as previously agreed between the parties concerned; the
consultations shall be held in respect o f the bases and
amounts o f the inoposed increase and the date Irom which
it is to be given effect.
3. A conlerence, in an effort to expedite consultations,
may or upon the request o f any ol the parties prescribed in
this Caide as entitled to participate in consultations on
geiteial freight-rate increases shall, where practicable.,
reasonably before the consultations, submit to the partici
pating parlies a report from independent accountants o f
repute, includirtg, where the requesting parties accept it as
one o f the bases o f coirsultations, an aggregated analysis o f
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data regarding«relevant costs and revenues which in the
opinion o f the conference necessitate an increase in freight
rales.
4. I f agreement is reached as a result o f the consulta
tions, the freight-rate increase shall take effect from the
dale indicated ,in the notice served in accordance with
article 14, paragraph 1, unless a later date is agreed upon
between the parties concerned.
5. I f no agreement is reached w ithin 30 days o f the
giving o f notice m accordance w ith article 14, paragraph 1,
and subject to procedures prescribed in tliis Code, the
matter shall be submitted immediately to international
mandatory conciliation, in accordance w ith chapter V I. The
recommendation of the conciliators, i f accepted by the
parties concerried, shall be binding upon them and shall be
implemented, subject to the provisions o f article 14,
paragraph 9, w ith effect from ifie date mentioned in the
conciliators’ reconunendation.
6. Subject to the provisions o f article 14, paragraph 9, a
general freiglit-rate increase may be implemented by a
conference pending the conciliators recoinmendaiiQii.
When making their reconunendation, the conciliators
should take into account the extent o f the abovementioned increase made by the conference and the jreriod
for which it has been in force. In the event that the
conference rejects the recommendation o f the conciliators,
shippers and/or shippers’ organizations shall have the right
to consider themselves not bound, alter appropriate notice,
by any arrangement or other contract with that conference
which may prevent them from using non-conference ship
ping lines. Where a loyalty arrangement exists, shippers
and/or sliippers’ organizations shall give notice w ithin a
period o f 30 days to the effect that they no longer consider
themselves bound by that arrangement, which notice shall
apply from the date mentioned therein, and a period o f not
less than 30 days and not more than 90 days shall be
provided in the loyalty arrangement for this purpose.
7. A deferred rebate which is due to the shipper and
■which has already been accumulated by the conference
sliall not be withheld by, or forfeited to, the conference as
a result o f action by the shipper under article 14, para
graph 6.
8. I f the trade o f a country carried by shipping lines
members o f a conference on a particular route consists
largely o f one or few basic commodities, any increase in the
freight rate on one or more o f those commodities shall be
treated as a general freight-rate increase, and the appiopriate provisions o f tlus Code sliall apply.

consultations conducted in accordance w ith article 14,
paragiaph 2. but unless otherwise agreed between the
parties concerned dining the consultations, the minimum
period oi time between tlie date when one general
freight-rate increase becomes effective and the date o f
notice for the next general freight-rate increase given in
accordance w ith article 14, paragraph 1 shall not be less
than 10 months.

A rticle 15
PROMOTIONAL FREIGHT RATES
1. Promotional freight rates fo r non-traditional exports
should be instituted by conferences.
2. A ll necessary and reasonable inform ation justifying
the need for a promotional freight rate shall be submitted'
to a conference by the shippers, sliippers’ organizations or
representatives o f shippers concerned.
3. Special jirocedures shall be instituted providing fo r a
decision w ithin 30 days from the date o f receipt o f that •
inform ation, unless mutually agreiyl otherwise, on applica
tions for promotional freight rates. A clear distinction shall
be made between these and general procedures for consider
ing the possibility o f reducing freight rates fo r other
commodities or o f exempting them from increases.
4 . Inform ation regarding the procedures fo r considering
applications for promotional freight rates shall be made
available by the confeience to sliippers and/or shippers
organizations and, on request, to the Governments and/or
other appropriate aulhorities o f the countries whose trade
is served by the conference.
5. A promotional freight rate shall be established nor
mally for a period o f 12 months, unless otherwise mutually
agreed between the parties concerned. Prior to tlie expiry
o f the period, the promotional freight rate shall be
reviewed, on request by the shippei and/or shippers’
organization concerned, when it shall be a m ailer fo r the
shipper and/or shippers’ organization, at the request o f the
conference, to show tliat the continuation o f the rate is
justified beyond the initial period.
6. When examining a request for a promotional freight
rate, the conference may take into account that, while the
rate should promote the export o f the non-traditional
product for which it is souglit, it is not likely to create
substantial competitive distortions in the export of a similar
product fiom another country served by the conference.
7. Promol ional freight rates are not excluded from thi
imposition o f a surcharge or a currency adjustment facto
in accordance w ith articles 16 and 17.

9. Conferences should institute any general freight-rale
• increase effective in accordance w ith this Code for a period
o f a slated minimum duration, subject always to the rules
regarding surcharges and regarding adjustment in Ireight
rates consetiuenl upon lluctuaiions in foreign exchange
rates. The period over which a general Ireight-rale increase
is to apply is an appropriate matter to be considered during

8. Each shipping line member o f a conference servini
the relevant polls o f a conference trade shall accept, am
not unreasonably icfuse, a fair share o f cargo for which
promotionaf freight rate has been established by th
conrercnce.
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A rticle 16
®

SURCHARGES

1. Surcharges imposed by a conference to cover sudden
or extraordinary increases in costs or losses o f revenue shall
be regarded as, temporary. They shall be reduced in
accordance w ith improvements in the situation or circum
stances wliich tliey were imposed to meet and shall be
cancelled, subject to article 16, paragraph 6, as soon as the
situation or circumstances which prompted their imposition
cease to prevail. This shall be indicated at the moment o f
their imposition, together, as far as possible, with a
description o f the change in the situation or circumstances
which w ill bring about their increase, reduction or cancel
lation.

with the provisions ol' this Code, as compared to the date
Irom which the surcharge was to be imposed in terms o f the
notice given in accordance w ith article 16, paragraph 3,
may be com|>en.saled by an equivalent prolongation o f tlie
surcharge before its removal. Conversely, for any surcharge
imposed by the conleieiice and subseijuently determined
and agreed to he unjustified or excessive as a result o f
consultations oi other procedures prescribed in this Code,
the amounts so collected or the excess thereof as deter
mined hereinabove, unless otherwise agreed, shall be re
funded to the parlies concerned, i f claimed by them, w itliin
a period ol 30 days o f such claim.

Article 17
2. Surcharges imposed on cargo moving to or from a
particular port shall likewise be regarded as temporary and
likewise shall be increased, reduced or cancelled, subject to
article 16, paragraph 6, when the situation in that port
changes.
3. Before any surcharge is imposed, whether general or
covering only a specific port, notice should be given and
there shall be consultation, upon request, in accordance
w ith tlie procedures o f this Code, between the conference
concerned and other parties directly affected by tlie
surcharge and prescribed in this Code as entitled to
participate in such consultations, save in those exceptional
circumstances which warrant immediate imposition o f the
surcharge. In cases where a surcharge has been imposed
w ithout prior consultation, consultations, upon request,
shall be held as soon as possible thereafter. Prior to such
consultations, conferences shall furnish data which in their
opinion ju stify the imposition o f the surcharge.
4. Unless the parties agree otherwise, w ithin a period o f
15 days after the receipt o f a notice given in accordance
w ith article 16, paragraph 3, i f there is no agreement on the
question o f the surcharge between the parties concerned
referred to in that article, the relevant provisions for
settlement o f disputes provided in this Code sliall prevail.
Unless the parties concerned agree otherwise, the surcharge
may, however, be imposed pending resolution o f the
dispute, i f the dispute still remains unresolved at the end o f
a period o f 30 days after the receipt o f the abovementioned notice.
5. In the event o f a surcharge being imposed, in
exceptional circumstances, without prior consultation as
provided in article 16, paragraph 3, i f no agreement is
reached through subsequent consultations, the relevant
provisions for settlement o f disputes provided in this Code
shall prevail.
6. Financial loss incurred by the shipping lines members
o f a conference as a result o f any delay on account o f
consultations and/or other proceedings for resolving
disputes regarding imposition o f surcharges in accordance

CURKIiNCY CHANGES
1. lixchange late cli.mg(;s, including formal devaluation
or revaluation, which lead to changes in the aggregate
operational costs and/oi levenues o f the shipping lines
inemheis o f a coideience lelaiing to their operations w ithin
the conleience piovide a valid reason for the introduction
o f a currency ail|usiment factor or J'or a change in the
fieight rates. The adjustment or change sliall be such that in
the aggiegate the memliei lines concerned neither gain nor
lose, as far as possible, as a result o f the adjustment or
change. 1'he adjustment or change may lake the form o f
currency surcharges oi discounts or o f increases or de
creases in the I'reight rales.
2. Such adjustments or changes shall be subject to
notice, which should be arranged in accordance w ith
regional practice, where such practice exists, and there shall
be consultations in accoidance w ith the provisions o f this
Code between the conference concerned and the other
parties directly alTecled and prescribed in this Code as
entitled to particijiaie in consultations, save in those
exceptional circumstances which warrant immediate impo
sition o f the currency adjustment factor or freight-rate
change. In the event that this has been done w ithout prior
consultations, consultations shall be held as soon as possible
thereafter. The consullations should be on the application,
size and dale o f imjilemenlation o f the currency adjustment
factor or Ireighl-rate change, and the same procedures shall
be followed for this purpose as are prescribed in article 16,
paragraphs 4 and 5, in resjiect o f surcharges. Such consulta
tions should lake place and be completed w ithin a period
not exceeding 15 days from the dale when the intention to
ap))ly a currency suicharge-or to effect a freight-rate change
is announced.
3. I f no agreement is reached w ithin 15 days through
con.sultations, the relevant provisions for settlement o f
disputes provided in this Code sliall prevail.
4. The provisions o f article 16, paragraph 6 shall apply,
adapted as necessary to currency adjustment factors and
freight-rale changes dealt w ith in the present article.
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Chapter V
OTHER MATTERS
A rticle 18

rapidly known to each other w ith a view to expediting
prompt decisions. When a conference considers it suitable,
it shall provide for adequate delegation o f powers o f
decision to its representatives.

FIGHTING SHIPS
A rticle 22
Members o f a conference shall not use figlrting ships in
the conference trade for the purpose o f excluding, prevent
ing or reducing competition by driving a shipping line not a
member o f the conference out o f the said trade.

A rticle 19
ADEQUACY OF SERVICE
1. Conferences should take necessary and appropriate
measures to ensure that their member lines provide regular,
adequate and efficient service o f the required frequency on
the routes they serve and shall arrange such services so as to
avoid as far as possible bunching and gapping o f sailings.
Conferences should also take into consideration any special
measures necessary in arranging services to handle seasonal
variations in cargo volumes.
2. Conferences and other parties prescribed in this Code
as entitled to participate in consultations, includitig appro
priate autliorities i f they so desire, should keep under
review, and sliould maintain close co-operation regarding
the demand for shipping space, the adequacy and suitability
o f service, and in particular tire possibilities for rationaliz
ation and for increasing the efficiency o f services. Benefits
identified as accruing from rationalization o f seivices shall
be fairly reflected in the level o f freight rates.

CONTENTS OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS,
TRADE PAR'TICIPATION AGREEMENTS
AND LO YA LTY ARRANGEMENTS
Conference agreements, trade participation agreements
and loyalty arrangements shall conform to the applicable
rei|uirements o f this Code and may include such other
provisions as may be agreed which are not inconsistent w ith
this Code.

Part two
Chapter VI
PROVISIONS AND MACHINERY FOR SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES
•«

A. U l'N l'R A L PROVISIONS
A rticle 23
1. The (irovisions o f this chapter shall apply whenever
theie is a dispute relating to the application or operation o f
the piovisions o f this Code hetween the following parties:
(a) A conference and a .shipping line;
( b j The shipping lines ineinhers o f a conference;

3. In respect o f any port for which conference services
are supplied only subject to the availability o f a specified
minimum o f cargo, that minimum sliall be specified in the
ta riff. Shippers sliould give adequate notice o f the avail
ability o f such cargo.

A rticle 20
HEAD OFFICE OF A CONFERENCE

(c j A conference or a sliipping line member thereof and
a shippers’ oigani/.ation oi lepicsentatives o f shippers or
sliip|)ers; and
(d) Two or more confemices.
For the purposes ol this chapter the term “ party” means
the oiiginal patties to the disjuite us well as third parties
which have joined tlie proceedings in accordance w ith (a) o f
article 34.

A conference shall as a rule establisli its head office in a
country whose trade is served by that conference, unless
agreed otherwise by the shipping lines members o f that
conference.

2 . Disputes between shijipiiig lines o f the same Hag, as
well as those between oigani/ulions belonging to the same
country,shall he seiileil within the framework o f the national
jurisdiction o f that e o iiiitiy , unless this creates serious
dilficulties in the fu llihneiit o l'tlie provisions o f this Code.

A rticle 21

3. T'he paities to a dispute shall first attempt to settle it
by an exchange o f views or direct negotiations with the
iiitention o f finding a mutually satisfactory solution.

REPRESENTATION
Conferences shall establish local representation in all
countries served, except that where there are practical
reasons to the. contrary the representation may be on a
regional basis. The naifies and addresses o f representatives
shall be readily available, and these representatives shall
ensure that the views o f sliippers and conferences are made

4. Disputes between the parties referred to in aiticle 23,
paragraph I relating to;
(a) Refusal o f adniission o f a national shipping line to a
conference serving the foreign trade o f the country o f that
shipping line;

( b ) Refusal o f admission o f a third-country shipping line
to a conference;
s

( c j Expulsion from a conference;
(d )

Inconsistency o f a conference agreement w ith this

Code;
(e) A general freiglit-rate increase;
(f)

Surcharges;

sent to the other party by registered letter, telegram or
telcpiinter or has been reived on it w ithin the time-limits
specified in arttcle 24, paiiigiuphs 2 or 5.
7.
Where no request has been made w ithin tire
linre-liinils specified in at tide 24, paragraphs 2 or 5, the
decision o f tlie confeience shall be final and no proceedings
under this chaplet may he brought by any party to the
dispute to challenge that decision.

(g) Changes in freight rates or the imposition o f a
currency adjustment factor due to exchange rate changes;
A rticle 25

(h) Participation in trade; and
( i) The form
arrangements

and

terms

of

proposed

loyalty

which have not been resolved througli an exchange o f views
or direct negotiations shall, at the request o f any o f the
parties to the dispute, be referred to international
mandatory conciliation in accordance w itli the provisions
o f this chapter.
A rticle 24
1. The conciliation procedure is initiated at the request
o f one o f tlie parties to the dispute.
2. The request shall be made:
(a j In disputes relating to membership o f conferences:
not later than 60 days from the date o f receipt by the
applicant o f the conference decision, including tlie reasons
therefor, in accordance w ith article 1, paragraph 4 and
article 4, paragraph 3;
( b j In disputes relating to general freight-rate increases:
not later than the dale o f expiry o f the period o f notice
specified in article 14, paragrapli 1;
(c) In disputes relating to suicharges: not later than the
date o f expiry o f the 30-day period specified in article 16,
paragraph 4 or, where no notice has been given, not later
than 15 days from the date when the surcharge was put
into effect; and
(d) In disputes relating to changes in freight rates or the
imposition o f a currency adjustment factor due to exchairge
rate changes: not later than five days after the date o f
expiry o f the period specified in article 17, paragraph 3.

1. Where the parties have agreed that disputes referred
to in article 23, paragraph 4 (a), (b), (cj, (d), (h) and (i)
shall be resolved through procedures other than those
established in that article, or agree on procedures to resolve
a particular dispute that has arisen between them, such
disputes shall, at the request o f any o f the parties to tire
dispute, be resolved as provided for in their agreement.
2. The provisions o f article 25, paragraph 1 apply also to
the disputes referred to in article 23, paragraph 4 (cj, (f)
and (g), unless national legislation, rules or regulations
prevent shippers from having this freedoyr o f choice.
3. Where conciliation proceedings have been initiated,
such proceedings shall have precedence over remedies
available under national law. I f a party seeks remedies
under national law in respect o f a dispute to which this
chaptei applies without invoking the procedures provided
for in this chapter, then, upon the request o f a respondent
to those proceedings, they shall be stayed and the dispute
shall be referred to the procedures defined in this chapter
by the court or other authority wliere the national remedies
are sought.

A rticle 26
1.
The Contracting Parties shall confer upon conferences
and shippers’ organixations such capacity as is necessary for
the application o f the provisions o f this chapter. In
particular:
(aj A conference or a sliippers’ organization may
institute proceedings as a party or be named as a party to
proceedings in its collective capacity;

3. The provisions o f article 24, paragraph 2 shall not
apply to a dispute wliich is referred to international
mandatory conciliation in accordance w ith article 25,
paragraph 3.

( b j Any notification to a conference or shippers’
organization in its collective capacity shall also coirstilute a
notification to each member o f such conference or
shippers’ organi/alion;

4. Requests for conciliation in disputes other than
those referred to in article 24, paragraph 2, may be made at
any time.

(c j A notification to a conference or shippers’
organization shall be transmitted to the address o f the head
office o f the conference or shippers’ organization. Each
conference or shippers’ organization shall register the
address o f its head office with the Registrar appointed in
accordance with article 46, paragraph 1. In the event that
a conference or a shippers’ organization fails to register or
has no head office, a notification to any member in the
name o f the conference or shippers’ organization shall be

5. The time-limits specified in article 24, paragraph 2
may be extended by agreement between the parties.
6. A request for conciliation shall be considered to have
been duly made i f it is proved that the request has been
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deemed to be a notification
organization.

to such conference or

fur the remainder o f his teim o f office. A nomination takes
effect lio m the date on which the communication o f the
nomination is received by the Registrar.

2.
Acceptance or rejection by a conference or shippers’
3. 1'he Registrar shall maintain the panel list and shall
organization o f a recommendation by conciliators shall be
regularly inform the Contracting Parties o f the composition
deemed to be acceptance or rejection o f such a
o fih e jta n e l.
recommendation by each member thereof.

A rticle 27

A rticle 31

Unless the parties agree otherwise, the conciliators may
decide to make a recommendation on the basis o f written
submissions w ithout oral proceedings.

1. The purpose o f conciliation is to reach an amicable
settlement o f the dispute througli recommendations
formulated by independent conciliators.

B. IN TER N ATIO N A L M AN D ATO R Y CONCILIATION

2. The conciliatois .shall tdenlify and clarify the issues in
dispute, seek for this purpose any inform ation from the
parties, aitd oit the basis thereof, submit to the parties a
recorrtrrterrditliitrr for lire selllertrerit o f the disjrute.

A rticle 28
In international mandatory conciliation the aiipropriatc
authorities o f a Contiacling Party shall, i f they so request,
participate in the conciliation proceedings in support o f a
party being a national o f that Contracting Party, or in
support o f a party having a dispute arising in the context o f
the foreign trade o f that Contracting Party. The appropriate
authority may alternatively act as an observer in such
conciliation proceedings.

A rticle 29
1. In
international
mandatory
conciliation
the
proceedings shall be held in the place unanimously agreed
to by the parties or, failing such agreement, in the place
decided upon by the conciliators.
2. In determining the place o f conciliation proceedings
the parties and the conciliators shall take into account,
inter alia, countries which are closely connected w ith the
dispute, bearing in mind the country o f the shipping line
concerned and, especially when the dispute is related to
cargo, the country where the cargo originates.

A rticle 30
1. For the purposes o f this chapter an international
panel o f conciliators shall be established, con.sisting o f
experts o f high repute or experience in the fields o f law,
economics o f sea transport, or foreign trade and finance, as
determined by the Contracting Parties selecting them, who
shall serve in an independent capacity.
2. Each Contracting Party may at any time nominate
members o f the panel up to a total o f 12, and shall
communicate their names to the Registrar. The
nominations shall be for periods o f six years each and may
be renewed. In the event o f the death, incapiicity or
resignation o f a member o f the panel, the Contracting Party
which nominated such person shall nominate a replacement

.1. The parlies shall cooperate in good faith w ith the
conciliators itt order lit ert.ilile them to carry out their
futtcitons.
4. .Subject to the provisions o f article«25, paragraph 2,
the parlies to the dispute ittay at any time durirtg the
currciliatton |)toceedittgs decide in agreement to have
recoitrse to a different irtoceditre for the settlement o f their
disjrute. The parlies to a dispute which has been made
subject to proceedings other than those provided tor in this
chapter may decide by m ulital agreement to have recourse
to interrralional niandrrtory corrciliation.

A rticle 32
1. The corrciliation proceedings shall be conducted
either by orte conciliator or by an uiteven number o f
conciliators agreed upon or designated by the parties.
2. Where the parties canrrot agree on the number or the
appointrncrrt o f the conciliators as provided in article 32,
paragraph 1, the conciliation proceedings shall be
conducted by three conciliators, one appointed by each
party in the staiemenl(s) o f claim and reply respectively;
aitd the third by the two cotrcilialors thus appoirrted, who
shall act as chairrnart.
3. I f the reply does rrol rtatne a corrciliator to be
itppointed hr cases where article 32, paragraph 2 would
apply, the securtd corrcilfator shall, w ithin 30 days
followirtg the receipt o f the statement o f claim, be chosen
by lot by the corrciliator appointed in the statement o f
claim from among the nternbets o f tire panel nominated by
the Contracting Party or Parties o f wliich the respondent(s)
is(are) a nationalfs).
4. Where the conciliators appointed in accordance w ith
article 32, paragraphs 2 or 3 cannot agree oir the
appoirrtment o f the third conciliator w ithin 15 days
following the date o f the appointment o f the second
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conciliator, he shall, w ithin the following 5 days, be chosen
by lot by tlie appointed conciliators. Prior to the drawing
by lot:
(a j No member o f the panel o f conciliators having the
same nationality as either o f the two appointed conciliators
shall be eligible for selection by lot;
(b)
from the
o f them
members
lot.

Each o f the two appointed conciliators may exclude
list o f the panel o f conciliators an equal number
subject to the requirement that at least 30
o f the panel shall remain eligible for selection bv

4. The conciliators shall not bring a finding o f non liquet
on the ground o f obscurity o f the law.
5. The conciliators may recommeiid those remedies and
reliefs which are provided in the law applicable to the
dispute.

A rticle 36
The recommendations o f the conciliators shall include
reasons.

A rticle 33
1. Where several parties request conciliation with the
same respondent in respect o f the same issue, or o f issues
which are closely connected, that respondent may request
tire consolidation o f those cases.
2. The request for consolidation shall be considered and
decided upon by majority vote by the chainvien o f the
conciliators so lar chosen. I f such request is allowed, the
chairmen will designate the conciliators to consider the
consolidated cases from among the conciliators so far
appointed or chosen, provided that an uneven number o f
conciliators is chosen and that the conciliator llrsi
appointed by each party shall be one ol the conciliators
considering the consolidated case.

A rticle 37
1. Unless the parties have agreed before, during or after
the conciliation procedure that the recommendation o f the
conciliators shall be binding, the recommendation shall
become binding by acceptance by the parties. A reconmiendation which has been accepted by some parties to a
dispute shall be binding as between those j)arties only.
2. Acceptance o f the recommendalion must be commuiucated by the parties to the conciliators, at an address
specilied by them, not later than 30 days alter receipt o f
the n o lilica lio ii ol the recommendation; otlicrwise, it shall
be considered that the recommendation has not been
accepted.

A rticle 34
Any party, other than an appropriate authority referred
to in article 28, il conciliation has been initiated, may join
in the proceedings:
either
(a) As a party, in case o f a direct economic interest;
or
(b j As a supporting party to one o f the original parties,
in case o f an indirect economic interest,
unless either o f the original parties objects to such joinder.

3. Any party which does not accept the reconunendalion shall n otify the conciliators and the other parties,
within 30 days following the period specified in article 37,
paragraph 2 ol its grounds for rejection o f the recommen
dation, cominehcnsively and in writing.
4. When the recommendation has been accepted by the
parlies, the conciliators shall immediately draw up and sign
a record ol settlement, at which time the recommendation
shall become binding upon those p arties.ilf the recommen
dalion has not lieen accepted by all parties, the conciUators
shall diaw up a lepoii with respect to those parties rejecting
the recommendalion, iioim g the dispute and the failure o f
those parties to settle the dispute.

A rticle 35
1. The recommendations o f the conciliators shall be
made in accordance w ith the provisions o f this Code.
2. When the- Code is silent upon any point, the concili
ators shall apply the law which the parties agree at the time
the conciliation proceedings commence or thereafter, but
not later than the time o f submission o f evidence to the
conciliators, hailing such agreement, the law which in the
opinion ol the conciliators is most closely connected with
the dispute shall be applicable.
3. The conciliators shall not decide ex aequo et bono
upon the dispute unless the parties so agree after the
dispute has arisen.

.S. A recommendation which has become binding upon
the |)aities shall be implemented by them immediately or at
such later lime as is specified in the recommendation.
(). Any party may make its acceptance conditional upon
acce|)tance by all or any o f the other parties to the dispute.

A rticle 38
I.
A recommenilalion shall constitute a final dcterminatioii ol a dispute as between the parties which accept it,
except to the extent that the recommendalion is not
recogni/.ed and enlorced in accordance w ith the provisions
ol article 39.
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3.
Where the recommendation has not been accepted by
2.
“ Recommendation” includes an interpretation, clari
any o f the parties, each party may publish the recommen
fication or revSion o f the recommendation made by the
dation and tlie reasons therefor and also its own rejection
conciliators before the recommendation has been accepted.
and the grounds therefor.
A rticle 39
1. Each Contracting Party shall recognize a recommen
dation as binding between the parties which have accepted
it and shall, subject to the provisions o f article 39,
paragraphs 2 and 3, enforce, at the request o f any sucli
party, all obligations imposed by the recommendation as if
it were a final judgement o f a court o f that Contracting
Party.
2. A recommendation shall not be recognized and
enforced at the request o f a party referred to in article 39,
paragraph 1 oidy if the court or other competent authority
o f the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought is satisfied that;
(a} Any party which accepted the recommendation was,
under the law applicable to it, under some legal incapacity
at the time o f acceptance;
(b ) Fraud or coercion has been used in the making o f
the recommendations;

A rticle 41
1. Docunrents and statements containing factual infor
mation supplied by any party to the conciliators shall be
made public unless that party or a majority o f the
conciliators agrees otherwise.
2. Such documents and statements supplied by a party
may be tendered by that party in support o f its case in
subsequent proceedings arising from tire same dispute and
between the same parties.

Article 42
Where the recommendation has not become binding
upon the parties, no views expressed or reasons given by the
conciliators, or concessions or offers made by the parties
for the purpose o f the conciliation_^procedure, shall affect
ihe legal rights and obligations o f any o f the parties.

(c) The recommendation is contrary to public policy
(ordre public) in the country o f enforcement; or

A rticle 43

(d ) The composition o f the conciliators, or the concili
ation procedure, was not in accordance with the provisions
o f tliis Code.

\. (u) The costs o f the conciliators and all costs o f tire
administration o f the conciliation proceedings shall be
borne equally by the parties to tire proceedings, unless they
3.
Any part o f the recommendation shall not be agree otherwise.
enforced and recognized if the court or other competent
■(b) Wheit the conciliation proceedings have been in
authority is satisfied that such part comes w ithin ;uiy o f the
itiated. the conciliators shall be entitled to require an
subparagraphs o f article 39, paragraph 2 and can be
advance or security for the costs referred to in article 43,
separated from other parts o f the recommendation. I f such
jraragraph 1 (a).
part cannot be separated, the entire recommendation sliall
not be enforced and recognized.
2. Each party sliall bear all expenses it incurs in
A rticle 40
1. Where the recommendation has been accepted by all
the parties, the recommendation and the reasons therelor
may be published w ith the consent o f all the parties.
2. Where the recommendation has been rejected by one
or more ol the parties but has been accepted by one or
more o f the parties:
(a) The party or parties rejecting the recommendation
shall publish its or their grounds for rejection, given
pursuant to article 37, paragraph 3, and may at the same
time publish the recommendation and the reasons therelor;
(b) A party which has accepted tlie recommendation
may publish the recommendation and the reasons therelor;
it may also publish the grounds for rejection given by any
other party unless such other party has already published
its rejection and the grounds therelor in accordance with
article 40, paragraph 2 (a).

connexion with the proceedings, unless the parties agree
otherwise.
3. Notwithstandnig tire provisions o f article 43, paragraplis 1 and 2, the conciliators may. having decided
unanimously that a party has brouglit a claim vcxatiously
or frivolously, a.ssess against that party any or all ol the
costs o f other parties to the proceedings. Such decision
shall he Itrral atrd binding on all the parties.

A rticle 44
1. Failure o f a party to appear or to present its case at
any stage o f the proceedings shall not be deemed an
adtnissiott o f the other party’s assertions. Irr that event, the
other party may, at its choice, request tire conciliators to
close the proceedings or to deal with tlie questions
presented to them and submit a recommendation in
accordance with the provisions for making recommen
dations set out in this Code.
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2. Before closing the proceedings, tlie conciliators siiall
grant the party <faiUng to appear or to present its case, a
period o f grace, not exceeding 10 days, unless they are
satisfied tfiat the party does not intend to appear or to
present its case.
3. Failure to observe procedural time-limits laid down in
this Code or determined by the conciliators, in particular
time-limits relating to the submission o f statements or
intorm ation, shall be considered a failure to appear in the
proceedings.
4. Where the proceedings have been closed owing to one
party’s failure to appear or to present its case, the
conciliators shall draw up a report noting that party’s
failure.

A rticle 45
1. The conciliators shall follow the procedures stipulated
in this Code.
2 . The rules o f procedure annexed to the present
Convention shall be considered .as model rules for the
guidance o f conciliators. The conciliators may, by mutual
consent, use, supplement or amend the rules contained in
the annex or formulate their own rules o f procedure to the
extent that such supplementary, amended or other rules are
not inconsistent w ith the provisions o f this Code.
3. I f the parties agree that it may be in the interest o f
achieving an expeditious and inexpensive solution o f the
conciliation proceedings, they may mutually agree to rules
o f procedure which are not inconsistent w itli the provisions
o f this Code.

who may be assisted by such additional staff as may be
necessary for the performance o f the functions listed in
article 46, paragraph 2. Administrative services for the
Registrar and his assistants shall be provided by the United
Nations Office at Geneva.
2. The Registrar shall perform the following functions in
consultation with the Contracting Parties as appropriate:
(a) Maintain the list o f conciliators o f the international
panel o f conciliators and regularly inform the Contracting
Parties o f the compusition o f the panel;
(b) Prirvide the names and addresses o f the conciliators
to tlic pal lies concerned on request;
(c) Receive and maintain copies o f requests for
conciliation, replies, recommendation, acceptances, or
rejections, including reasons therefor;
(d) I'urnish on request, and at their cost, copies o f
recommendations and reasons fo r rejection to the shippers’
oiganizations, conlerences and Governments, subject to the
provisions o f article 4U;
(e) Make available information o f a non-confidential
naiuie on completed conciliation cases, and w ithout
attribution to the pailies concerned,Tor the purposes o f
preiiaration o f maleiial foi the Review Conference referred
to in article 52; and
U'j The other I'unctions prescribed for the Registrar in
article 26, paragraph 1 (c j and article 30, paragraphs 2
and .1.

C'hui>ter V II
FIN A L CLAUSES
A rticle 47

4. The conciliators shall formulate their recommen
dation by consensus or failing that shall decide by majority
vote.
5. The conciliation proceedings shall finish and the
recommendation o f the conciliators shall be delivered not
later than six months from the dale on which the
conciliators are appointed, except in the cases referred to in
article 23, paragraph 4 (e), (f), and (^), for which the lime
lim its in article 14, paragraph 1 and article 16, paragraph 4
sliall be valid. I'he period o f six months may be extended
by agreement o f the parties.

C. INSTITUTIONAL M AC H IN ER Y
A rticle 46
1. Six montlis before the entry into force o f the present
Convention, the Secretary-General o f the United Nations
shall, subject to the approval o f the General Assembly o f
the United Nations, and taking into account the views
expressed by the Contracting Parties, appoint a Registrar,

IMPLEMENTATION
1. Each Coni rai ling Party shall take such legislative or
other measures as may he necessary to implement the
present Convention.
2. Each Contiacling I'aity shall communicate to the
Secielaiy-Geneial ol the United Nations, who shall be the
depusitaiy, the text ol the legislative or other measures
which it has taken in older to implement the present
Convention.

A rticle 48
s ig n a t u r e ;, r a t i e i c a t i o n

, acceptance,
APPROVAL AND ACCESSION

I. The present Convention shall remain open for
signature as from 1 July 1674 until and including 30 June
1975 at United Nations Headquarters and sliall thereafter
remain open for accession.
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* A rticle 50

2. A ll States^* ate entitled to become Contracting Parties
to the present Convention by;
(a) Signature subject to and followed by ratification,
acceptance or approval; or
(b) Signature w ithout reservation as to ratification,
acceptance or approval; or
(c) Accession.
3. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall
be effected by the deposit o f an instrument to this effect
w ith the depositary.

DENUNCIATION
1. The present Convention may be denounced by any
Contracting Party at any time after the expiration o f a
period o f two years from the date on which the Convention
has entered into force.
2. Denunciation
writing, and shall
period as may
denuitciation, after

sliall be notified to the depositary in
.take effect.one year, or such longer
be specified in the instrument o f
the dale o f receipt by the depositary.

A rticle 51
A rticle 49

a m e n d m e n ts

ENTRY IN ’1'0 FORCE
1.
The present Convention shall enter into force six
months after the date on which not less than 24 States, the
combined tonnage o f which amounts to at least 25 per cent
o f world tonnage, have become Contracting Parlies to it in
accordance w ith article 48. For the purpose o f the iKesenl
article the tonnage sliall be deemed to be that contained in
Lloyd's Register o f Shipping - Statistical Tables 1973,
table 2 “ World Fleets - Analysis by Principal Types” , in
respect to general cargo (including passengcr/cargo) ships
and container (fu lly cellular) ships, exclusive o f the United
States reserve fleet and the American and Canadian Great
Lakes fieels.'^
2. For each State which thereafter ratifies, accepts,
approves o j accedes to it, the present Convention shall
come into force six months after deposit by such Stale ol
the appropriate instrument.
3. Any State which becomes a Contracting Party to the
present Convention after the entry into force o f an
amendment shall, failing an expression o f a different

1. Any Conlracling Parly may propose one or more
amendments to the present Convention by communicating
the amendments to the depositary. The depositary shall
circulate such amendments among the Contracting Parlies,
for their acceptance, and among States entitled to become
Conlracling Patties to the present Convention which are
not Contracting Parlies, for their infonpation.
2. Each proposed amendment circulated in accordance
with article 51, paragraph 1 shall be deemed to have been
accejited i f no Conlracling Parly communicates an
objection theielo to tlie depositary within 12 months
following the dale o f its circulation by the depositary. 11 a
Contracting Parly ctmmiunicates an objection to the
proposed arnendinenl, such amendment shall not be
consideied as accejiled and shall not be put into effect.
3. I f no objection has been communicated, the
amendment shall enter into force for all Contracting Parties
six months aflei the expiry date o f the period o f 12 months
referred to in article 51, paragraph 2.

intention by tlial Slate:
(a) Be considered as a Party, to the present Convention

Article 52
k i ;v if ;w c o n f e r e n c e s

as amended; and
(h) Be considered as a Party to the unamended
Convention in relation to any Parly to the present
Convention not bound by the amendment.

? A t its 9th plenary m eetliii; on 6 A p ril 1979, the Coiirerence
adopted the fo llo w iiii! understanding recommended by its T hird
Main Com m ittee;
•Tn accordance w ith its terms, the present Convention w ill be
open to participation by all States, and the Secrelary-tjcnerul o f
the United Nations w ill act as depositary. It is the understanding
o f the Conference that the Secretary-General, in discharging his
functions as depositary o f a convention or other m ultila te ra l
legally binding instrum ent w ith an “ All-States” clause, w ilt fo llo w
the practice o f the General Assembly ol the United Nations in
im plem enting such a clause and, whenever advisable, w ill request
the opinion o f the General Assembly belore receiving a sigriulure
or an instrum ent o f ra tifica tio n , acceptance, approval or ac
cession.”
t> The tonnage requirements for the purposes o l article 49
paragraph 1 are set out in part tw o below.

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by Uie
depositary five years from the date on which the present
famveniion comes into force to review the working o f the
Convention,
with
particular
reference
to
its
implementation, and to consider and adopt appropriate
amendments.
2. The dejmsilaiy shall, four years from the date on
which the present Convention conies into force, seek the
views o f all .Slates entitled to attend the Review Conference
and shall, on the basis o f the views received, prepare and
circulate a draft agenda as well as amendments proposed fo r
consideration by the ( onlerence.
3 Furlhei leview conferences shall be similarly
conveneil every live years, or at any lime after the first
Review Conleieiice, at the request ol one-third ol the
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Contracting Parties to the present Convention, unless tlie
first Review Conference decides otherwise.

A N N I.X TO T H E C O N V E N TIO N
M ik I oI lulva o f piuculuic loi intumatioiial mandatory conciliation

4.
Notwithstanding the provisions o f article 52,
paragraph 1, i f the present Convention has not entered into
force five years from the date o f the adoption o f the Final
A ct of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on a Code o f Conduct for Liner Conferences, a Review
Conference sliall, at the request o f onc-tJiird o f the States
entitled to become Contracting Parties to the present
Convention, be convened by the Secretary-General o f the
United Nations, .subject to the approval o f the General
Assembly, in order to review the provisions o f the
Convention and its annex and to consider and adopt
appropriate amendments.

FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPOSITARY
1. The depositary shall notify the signatory and acceding
States of:
(a) Signatures, ratifications, acceptances, approvals and
accessions in accordance with article 48;
(b ) The date on which the present Convention enters
into force in accordance with article 49;
present

Convention

1. Any jiatly wi.sliin(! lu instilule conciliution proceedings under
llie Code shall addiess a leipiest 10 that effect in writing,
ai'conipaiiied by a slateineiit o f claim to Ihe other parly,andcopied
to the Registrar.
2. I'he stalement o f claim shall;
(o) Designate preci.scly each party to the dispute and state the
address of each;
(h) Contain a summaiy statement of pertinent facts, the issues in
dispute and Ihe claimant's pioposal for the settlement o f the
dispute;
(c) .Slate wlielhe.i an oial hearing is desired and, i.f so, and to the
extent then known, the names and addresses o f persons to give
evidence, imlulling e.xpeils’ evidence, foi the claimant;
i>t) lie aeeoiiip.iiiied by sueli supporting documentation and
lelevani agieeiiienls and aiiaiigemenls entered into by the parlies as
Ihe cl.nmani may loii.sidei iieie.ssary at the lime o f making the
claim.

A rticle 53

(c j Denunciations o f the
accordance w ith article 50;

Rule I

( ‘‘j iiidiiale the iiniiibei ol loncilialors rei|uiied, any proposal
conceiniiig the a|>poniinieiii ol eoiicihatois, or the name o f the
eoiii'iliator apponileil by llu • hiimaiit in accoidaiiee w illi article 32,
paiagiaph 2, and

It

(!) Contain pioposaK. il ,iiiy, icgarding rules o f procedure.
J. Ihe slalenieiii ol i laini shall be dated and shall be signed by
the paiiy.

in
tiu le 2

1. I f the respondent decides to reply to the claim, he shall,
(d)
Reservations to the present Convention and the
wiihin .50 days following the date o f his receipt o f the statement o f
withdrawal o f reservations;

(c) The text o f the legislative or other measures which
each Contracting Party has taken in order to implement the
present Convention in accordance with article 47;
U ) Pfoposed amendments and objections to proposed
amendments in accordance with article 51; and
(g) Entry into force o f amendments in accordance with
article 51, paragraph 3.
2. The depositary shall also undertake such actions as
are necessary under article 52.

A rticle 54
AUTHENTIC TEXTS -- DEPOSIT

claiin, liansmil a legily lo ihe other party and copied to the
Registrar.

2. The reply sliall:
(a) Coiilain a suiiiinaiy slaiement o f pertinent facts opposed to
the conlenlioiis in Ihe statement of claim, the respondent’s
propo.sal, if any, for the sellleinent o f the dispute and any remedy
claimed by him with a view lo the selllemenl o f the dispute;
(b) Stale whether an trial hearing is desired and, if so, and to the
exieiil then known, the iianies and addresses o f persons to give
evidence, inehidirig experts' evidence, fox the rcspondeiit;
(c) lie accompanied by such supporting documentation and
relevani agreements and arrangements entered into by the parties as
the respondent may consider iieee.ssary at the lime of making the
reply;
(U) Indicate the number of conciliators required, any proposal
concerning the appoininieni o f conciliators, or the name o f the
conciliator appointed by the respondent in accordance with
arliclc 32, paragrapli 2; and
(cJ Contain proposals, if any, regarding rules o f procedure.

The original o f the present Convention, o f which the
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally
authentic, w ill
be
deposited
w ith
the
Secretary-General o f the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having been
duly authorized to this effect by their respective
Govermnents, have signed the present Convention, on the
dates appearing opposite their signatures.

lOiqffin

3. I'he reply shall be dated and shall be signed by the party.

Rule 3
1. Any person or other interest desiring lo participate in
conciliation proceedings under article 34 shall transmit a written
request to Ihe parlies lo the dispute, with a copy lo the Registrar.
2. I f participation in accordance with fa) o f article 34 is desired,
the request shall set forth Ihe grounds therefor, including the
iilformalion required under rule 1, paragraph 2 (a), (h) and (d).
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3. I f p a rtic ip a ti^ in accordance w itli (b) o f article 34 is desired,
the request shall state the grounds therefor and winch o f the original
parties would be supported.
4. Any objection to a request for joinder by such a party shall be
sent by the objecting party, with a copy to the other parly, within
seven days o f receipt o f the request.
5. In the event that two or more proceedings arc consolidated,
subsequent requests for third-party participation sliall be trans
mitted to all parlies concerned, each o f which may object in
accordance with tlie present rule.
Kule 4
By agreement between tlie parties to a dispute, on motion by
either party, and alter aflording the parties an ojrportunily ot being
heard, the conciiiators may order the consolidation or separation ol
all or any claims then pending between the same (larties.

begins to tun shall not be counted, and the last day o f the period
shall be counted, except where that last day is a Saturday, Sunday or
a public holiday at the place o f conciUation, in which case the last
day shall be the next business day.
2.
When the lime provided for is less than seven days, inter
mediate Satuidays, Sundays and public holidays shall be excluded
from the compulation.

Rule 9
Subject to the provisions relating to procedural time-limits in the
Code, the conciliators may, on a m otion by one o f the parties or
puisiianl to agreement between them, extend any such lime-lim it
which lias been fixed by the conciliators.

Rule 10

Rule 5

1. I he concilialois shall fix the order o f business and, unless
otherwise agieeil, the dale and hour ol each session.

1. Any party may challenge a conciliator wiiere circumstances
exist that cause juslitiable doubts as to his independence.

2. Unless the paities otherwise agree, the proceedmgs shall take
place III piivale.

2. Notice o f challenge, stating reasons tlierefor, should be made
prior to the date o f the closing o f the proceedings, before the
conciliators have rendered their recommendation. Any such
challenge shall be heard promptly and shall be determined by
m ajority vote o f the conciliators in the Irrst instance, us a
prelintinary point, hr cases where more than one conciliator has
been appointed. The decision in such cases shall be fin a l.^

3. The conciliators slialt specillcally inquire o f all the parties
whether they have any lu rllie r evidence to submit before declaring
the pioceedings closed, and a noting thereul shall be recorded.

3. A conciliator who has died, resigned, become incapacitated or
disqualified shall be replaced promptly.

t'oiicihalors' recoininendalions shall be in writing and sliall
include:

Rule U

(uj riie precise designullon and address ol each parly;
4. Proceedings interrupted in this way shall continue Irom the
point where they were interrupted, unle.ss it is agreed by the parties
or ordered by the conciliators that a review or lehearing o f any oral
testimony lake place.

(c) 'I'lie dales and place o f the conciliation proceedings;
(J) A suimnaiy of the lO iiciliatioii pioceedings, as the concilialpiH deem appiopiiale.

Rule 6
The conciliators shaU be judges o f their own jurisdiction and/or
competence w ithin tlie provisions o f the Code.

(e) A suininuiy statement ol the facts lound by the conciliators,
IJ) A summaiy o f the siilmiissions of the parlies;
/g/ Puniouiicenieiits on tlie issues in dispute, logeliier w ith the
iea.sons tlie ic lo i,

Rule 7
1. The conciliators shall receive and consider all written stale
inents, documents, alfidavits, publications ot any other evidence,
including oral evidence, which may be submitted to them by or on
behalf o f any o f the patties, and shall give such weiglit thereto as in
their judgement such evidence merits.
2. (a) Kach parly may submit to the conciliators any material it
considers relevant, and at the lime o f such submission shall deliver
certified copies to any ulhct parly to the proceedings, which party
siiull be given a reasonable opportunity to reply thereto;
(b) The conciliators shall be the sole judges o f the relevance and
materiahty o f the evidence submitted to them by the patties;

I

(hi A desciiplion ol the method of appointing conciliators,
including I lieu nuiiies;

(c) The conciliators may ask the parties to produce such
additional evidence as they may deem necessary to an understanding
and determination o f the dispute, provided tliai, if such additional
evidence is produced, the other parlies to the proceedings shall have
a reasonable opportunity to comment thereon.

(hj The signatiiies ol the conciliators and the dale o f each
signaliiie, and
(i) An adilics.s loi the coniniunicalion o f the acceptance or
leicclloii o f the ici oinim inlalion.

Rule 12
Ihe lecoinniendalioii shall, so fat as possible, contain a
nounccniciil on uisls in uciordance w ith the provisions ol the Code.
I f the rcconiinendalion does not contain a fu ll pronouncement on
costs. Ihe concilialois shall, as soon as possible alter the reconiineniluiiim , am) in any even) ivoi latei than 60 days ihercaller,
®
pronounceiiieiit in writing legaiding costs as provided in the Code.

Rule 13

Conciliators' tecomniendations shall also take into account
previous and similar cases whenever this would facilitate a more
u n ifo iiii implemenlatioii ol the Code and observance o f conciUators
1.
Whenever a period o f days for tlie doing o f any act is provided
recommendations.
for in the Code or in these rules, the day trom which the period
R u le s

umiiaminiw

mm

Annex 11
RESOLLTIIONS A D O ITE D »Y H IE CONI IJIti N t E

1. Completion o f the work o f tlie Conference
77ie United Nations Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on a
Code o f Conduct fo r Liner Conferences,
Having m et in accordance w illi General Assembly
resolution 3035 (X X V ll) o f 19 December 1972 to consider
and adopt a convention or any other multilaterid legally
binding instrument on a code o f conduct for liner
conferences,
Having agreed unanimously in respect o f a large number
o f paragraphs contained in the draft code o f conduct for
liner conferences annexed to the reports o f the three main
cormnittees o f the Conference o f Plenipotentiaries,
Having noted that the principles in regard to the
settlement o f some fundamental issues before the United
Nations Conference o f Plenipotentiaries for a Code o f
Conduct for Liner Conferences submitted by the President
o f the Conference, and annexed to this resolution, have
been accepted, among the States participating in the
Conference, by all developing, countries, all socialist
countries o f Eastern Euro])e and a number o f developed
market-economy countries, and having noted also that a
number o f other develojjed market-economy countries have
not accepted the above-mentioned principles and that a
number o f other such countries have rcsei'ved their position
on the subject,
Taking note that all countries which have accepted the
principles referred to in the preceding paragraph have
agreed that these principles shall form the basis o f further
work on the relevant sections o f the draft code o f conduct
for liner conferences,
Taking note also o f the views o f countries which have
not accepted the principles referred to above and the desire
o f these countries that their views be taken into account in
the further work,
1. Takes note o f the substantial progress achieved during
the first part o f the Conference;
2. Takes note also o f the report on the plenary meetings
o f the Conference and o f the reports o f its three main
corrunitiees;
3. Considers that tire best interests o f all countries w ill
be served by a resumption o f the United Nations
Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on a Code o f Conduct for

Liner Confeieiue.s In (lenevu on 11 March 1974 for a
perioil o f ihiee weeks in o/der that it may complete its task;
4. iiainests the .Sei lelaiy-General o f the United Nations
and the Sccielai y-Geneial o f UNCTAD to make
airangemenis foi the le.snmption o f the Conference o f
Plenipotentiaries accoidmgly;
5. A ffirm s that the large number o f paragraphs agreed
unanimously and contained in the draft code o f conduct
for liner conferences annexed to the reports o f the three
main committees o f the Conference o f Plenipotentiaries
shall not be reopened for any further discussion or for
changes in the texts o f these paragraplia, w ith the exception
o f any editorial and/or legal drafting changes that may be
deemed necessary;
6. Notes the agreement o f all countries who have
accepted the principles in regard to the settlement o f some
fundamental issues before the United Nations Conference
submitted by the President o f the Conference, and annexed
to this resolution, to continue to regard these principles as
the basis for further work at the resumed Conference o f
Plenipotentiaries and not to reopen discussion on these
principles and also not to reopen for any further discussion
or changes the relevant paiagraphs o f the draft code agreed
by ail such countries, and based on these principles, w ith
the exception o f any editorial and/or legal drafting changes
that may be deemed necessary or any other drafting
changes considered necessary for securing improved con
form ity o f the texts o f these paragraphs w ith tire agreed
princijrles;
7. Confirms the willingness o f ail parties to this resol
ution to continue negotiations at the resumed Conference
o f Plenipotentiaries from the stage reached at its adjourn
ment with a view to considering and adopting at tlie
resumed conference a convention or any other m ultilateral
legally binding instrument on a code o f conduct for liner
conferences;
8. Requests the UNCTAD secretariat to prepare texts in
legal language in respect o f texts annexed to the reports o f
the main committees o f the Conference and to circulate
such texts to the Governments o f all member States as an
aid to their consideration well in advance o f the resumption
o f the Conference o f Plenipotentiaries.
6th plenary meeting
15 December 1973
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A N N E X TO RESO LUTIO N I
Principles in regard to the settlement of some fundamental issues
before the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences

A. Role o f G o ve rn m e nt

2. I'he tinie belween the date when one general freight-rate
increa.sc becomes elfcctive anil the date o f notice o f the next general
lieighi late increase sliould not be less than 12 months.
Note. Keleiencc was made to the apprehensions among different
groups in regaid to the question of outside competition, but the
liope was expressed that tliis problem would be satisfactorily
resolved by niuiuul discussion m the Committee or drafting group
cuiiceined.

]. Upon the request of Governments, requisite infurmatiun is to
be furnished by the conferences.
2. Government representatives are to have tlie right to be present
during consultations, to participate in tire iliscussioiis fully, to make
suggestions, and to promote agreement between the parties, but
they shall have no role of a decision-maker.
3. Governments are to have a similar right of participation in
conciliation proceedings.

• D. P articiim tion in trade
1. Equality o f the rights o f national lines at the two ends.

2. Noii-cuiifcrence shipping lines
The U iiiied Nuluma Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on a
Code u fC o itd tii'l fo r fin e r Conferences,
llavitig prt'iMtred llic ('(invention on a Code o f Conduct
for Liner Confeienccs w illi a view to improving the liner
conlerence system,
Bearing in mind Itial the Convention is applicable to liner
coiifereiices and llieii external relations,

2. A share o f 2U per cent is to be allocated to third-flag lines
where tliey exist.

Rest/lves that:

3. If national lines do not carry, or are unable to carry, their
allocated share o f the trade - and on this point tliey themselves
shall make the decision - that portion o f their share of the trade
which tliey do not carry will revert to tlie pool to be shared pro
rata.

I. Notliing ill llia l Converilion ^lall be construed so as
to deny sliippeis an nplion in the cliotce between confer
ence slii|)ping lines and non-conference shipping lines
subject to any loyally aiiangenients where they exist;

4. National lines within a region at one end are to liave the
flexibility o f adjustments among theiuscives in regard to their
shares.

1. Non-conlciciice shipping lines competing w ith a
coni'eience should adheie to the principle o f fair competilio ii on u conniieiciiil basis;

C. Im plem entation
1. Every effort is to be made by the parties to reach a settlenienl
during consultations.
2. Where a matter is not settled by consultation and a dispute
arises, it should be submitted to mandatory international conci
liation; among such matters are qucstions.relating to freiglit rates,
surcharges, and currency adjustment factors.

.1. In the iiueiesi o f sound development o f liner shipping
service, non-conference shipping lines should not be prevenled from operating as long as tliey comply w ith the
reijiiireinenls o f parugia])h 2 above.
9th plenary meeting
6 A p ril 1974

3. Conciliators' recommendations, if accepted by the parties,
shall be binding.
4. I f conciliators’ recommendations are rejected, reasons for their
rejection ate to be staled comprehensively in writing and published.

i . Local conciliation

5. A review conference is to be convened after five years to
review the working o f the convention with particular reference to
implementation. Such review conferences aie to be held every five
years thereafter.

The United Nations Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on a
Code o f Conduct fo r Liner Conferences,

D. Criteria f o r the determ ination o f fre ig h t rates

Bearing in mind the importance o f the consultation
provisions and the dispute settlement procedures provided
in the Convention on ,a Code o f Conduct fo r Liner
Conferences,

1. These criteria should be as contained in the proposal sub
mitted by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe for paragraph S4
o f the Code.*

■ For the text o f this proposal, which was subsequently spon
sored also by the Group o f 77 and by France, see alternative 1 to
paragraph 54 o f the Code in United Nations Conference o f

Plenipotentiaries on a Code o f Conduct fo r Liner Conferences,
vol. 1, Reports and other documents (U nited Nations publication.
Sales No. £.75.11.1). 11), part fo u r, sect. 1.

i1i CH(Wi w M irwn » i twiiti»>wi m

Noting that proposals were made to provide in the Code
for submitling some disjuites to local conciliation,
1. Reiptests the first Review Conference to be convened in
accordance with article 52 o f the Convention to give
priority consideration lo the subject o f local conciliation,
taking into account the views expressed by the Contracting
Parlies to the Convention on whether or not the absence o f'
local conciliation has hampered the effective settlement o f

136.
disputes and, i f so, which subjects should be considered
appropriate fo r liStal conciliation and what procedures
should be applied for resolving such disputes.

attend the Review Cunfeience, which should be required to
take into account the views expressed by appropriate
authorities, liner conferences and shippers’ organizations.

2. Agrees that in preparing for the Review Conference the
depositary shall seek the views o f all States entitled to

9 th plenary meeting
■ 6 A p ril 1974
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